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ABSTRACT 
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has 
experienced a steadily growing case docket over the last decade. This rise in the 
number of cases submitted to ICSID for arbitration has resulted in both 
procedural inefficiencies and inconsistent decisions concerning similar factual 
and legal issues. In many other areas of law, consolidation is used to mitigate 
these concerns, however, the ICSID system at present has no mechanism for the 
consolidation of claims. This paper addresses the question of whether 
consolidation would be appropriate for the ICSID framework. In doing so, it 
considers the motivations behind consolidation and their application to the 
ICSID system, and the ways in which ICSID could introduce consolidation into 
its procedure. The paper concludes that ICSID should introduce consolidation 
with a view to improving procedural efficiency. Such a change, the paper 
concludes, could be effected by an amendment to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
which can be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Administrative Council. 
The introduction of consolidation would improve the operation of the ICSID 
system, resulting in more efficient and cost-effective justice, and would help 
restore a sense of legitimacy in the system. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes , 
bibliography and appendices) comprises 14,431 words. 
Investment Treaty Arbitration-ICSID-con olidation 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a surge in the activity of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the Centre). 1 From 
the Centre's creation in 1965 to July 2000 there had been 66 cases submitted for 
arbitration. The total at the time of writing was 269. 2 With such an increase 
comes a higher possibility for claims concerning the same legal or factual issues. 
This can give rise to two principal problems. Firstly, if similar claims are 
determined by different arbitral tribunals, inconsistent decisions could be 
rendered. Susan Franck has described the incidence of inconsistent decisions as 
investment treaty arbitration's "dirty little secret that is becoming less secret 
everyday"3, as the issue has recently gained more international attention.4 The 
second problem is that if similar claims are allowed to proceed individually, 
procedural delay may result. 
This paper will analyse whether ICSID should establish an institutional 
framework for the consolidation of claims. The issue arises principally out of 
some recent high profile cases under ICSID, which have resulted in inconsistent 
decisions, 5 as well as a desire for procedural economy within a system that is 
faced with a steady rise of claims. 
In considering the need for a framework of institutional consolidation m 
ICSID, this paper will firstly summarise the problem that is to be addressed. It 
will then provide an overview of some of the inconsistent decisions in ICSID, 
which illustrate one of the problems that unconsolidated proceedings can pose. 
The next part will consider how consolidation is effected in both domestic legal 
1 Stephen Jagusch and Matthew Gearing "International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID)" in J William Rowley QC (ed) Arbitration World: Jurisdictional Comparisons 
(2ed, The European Lawyer Ltd, London, 2006) lxvii . 
2 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes www.icsid.worldbank.org 
(accessed 1 August 2008) [ICSID website]. 
3 Susan D Franck HToe ature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: 
Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future" (2005) 12 UC Davi s J Int 'l L & Pol 'y 47, 55. 
4 See for example, ICSID Secretariat "Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSJD 
Arbitration" (Discussion Paper, 22 October 2004) paras 20 23 [IC ID Discussion Paper]; 
ll10mas W Walsh" ubstantive Review of IC ID Awards: Is the De ire for Accuracy Sufficient 
to Compromise Finality?" (2006) 24 Berkeley J Int ' l L 444. 
5 These are discussed below: see Part Ill Inconsistent Decisions in ICSID. 
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systems and in international commercial arbitration. By way of comparison, 
consolidation in other areas will be considered. The pecific focus will be on 
consolidation in mass claims processes and the Notih American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) consolidation framework. The paper will contrast these 
models to the investment treaty arbitration system. In light of this assessment, the 
writer will then frame the parameters of the issue of consolidation as it is seen in 
the investment treaty arbitration realm. The paper will then consider some 
pecific problems with introducing consolidation into 1CSID. The question of 
how consolidation could be introduced into the ICSID framework will be 
addressed, followed by a con ideration of some of the other options available to 
ICSID to remedy the problem posed by the absence of consolidation. Finally, the 
paper will conclude on how the balance between consolidation and the traditional 
benefits of arbitration should be struck. 
II AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
The lack of any ability to consolidate claims results in two important, yet 
distinct, problems for the ICSID system: inconsistency and procedural 
inefficiency. 
A Inco11siste11t Decisions 
The problem of inconsistent decisions has ari en essentially because of the 
structure of the investment treaty arbitration system and the characteristics of 
arbitration more generally. One of the defining characteristics of arbitration is 
that there is no doctrine of precedent, meaning that arbitral decisions and awards 
need not take into account of, or follow, previous decisions of a similar nature. 
The possibility for incon istency in this context is obvious, and the parties to 
arbitration assume this risk when they make the conscious choice to submit their 
di pute to arbitration. 
The problem al o an es, more indirectly, out of changes to the 
international economic environment, the most notable of which is the formidable 
growth, in recent years, of international investment in states by private 
10 
companies. 6 Against this backdrop, it is becoming increasingly conunon for 
states to be parties to international arbitrations. 7 This is primarily because of an 
increase in agreements by states to submit any investment disputes to binding 
arbitration, most commonly by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). 8 
International investment law and protection is made up of a complex and 
uncoordinated web of BITs and investment agreements in which multiple 
shareholders may hold an interest.9 This is exacerbated by the lack of 
international regulation of this environment. ' 0 Because of this framework, it is 
quite possible for multiple claims arising from either the same facts, or giving rise 
to the same legal issue, or both, to come before separate tribunals. This 
possibility has been heightened by the broad nature of the definition of 
"investment" and "investor" in most BITs, 11 which has, in practice, allowed for 
different parties to the same investment to pursue independent claims, thus 
opening the door for multiple claims based on similar facts and legal issues. 12 
6 Moshe Hirsch The Arbitration Mechanism of !he lnternalional Cenlerfor 1he Se1tlemen1 of 
investment Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1993) I. 
7 lbid, 10. 
8 See for example, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 1959-1999" (2000) UNCT AD/ITE/IW2; United at ions Conference on Trade and 
Development (ed) "World Investment Report 2005 - Transnational Corporations and the 
Internationalization ofR&D" (2005) UNCTAD/WIR/2005; For a list ofBITs see United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development www.unctadxi.org (accessed 2 August 2008). 
9 Campbell Mclachlan QC, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger Internalional lm·estment 
Arbitralion - Subslantive Principles (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) para 4.117; Giorgio 
Sacerdoti "ll1e Proliferation of Bits: Conflicts of Treaties, Proceedings and Awards" (2007) 
Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No 07-02, 2. 
10 The Hague Conference on Private International Law attempted to negotiate a global regime on 
jurisdiction and recognition of judgements but was unsuccessful : see Fausto Pocar and Costanza 
Honorati Hague Prelimina,y Draft Convention on Jurisdic1ion and Judgments (Cedam, Padua, 
2005). See also for example, Howard Mann "Transparency and Consistency in International 
Investment Law: Can the Problems be Fixed by Tinkering?" in Karl P Sauvant (ed) Appeals 
Mechanism in International lm•estment Disputes (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 
213. 
11 See for example the wide meaning given to "investment'' in Lanco lnlernational Inc v 
Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) 5 ICSID Rep 367 (lCSID, 1998, Cremades P, Alvarez & 
Bapti ta) para I O and A:::urix Co,p v A,gentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (2004) 43 ILM 262 
(ICSID, 2003, Sureda P, Lauterpacht & Martin "). 
12 As evidenced by the CME/Lauder arbitrations: CME C::ech Republic B V (The Netherlands) v 
C::ech Republic (Partial Award) 9 ICSID Rep 121 (UNCITRAL, 200 I, Kuhn C, Schwebel & 
Hand!); CME C::ech Republic BV (The Netherlands),. C::ech Republic (Final Award) 9 ICSID 
Rep 264 (UNCITRAL, 2003, Kuhn C, Schwebel & Brownlie); and Lauder v C::ech Republic 
(Fina l Award) 9 lC ID Rep 62 (UNCITRAL, 2001, Briner C, Cutler & Klein). 
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Inconsistent decisions are potentially a significant problem for the 
investment treaty arbitration world as they have the potential to call into question 
the legitimacy of the ICSlD system.
13 As Moshe Hirsch notes: 
14 
"Undoubtedly, one of the basic conditions for the existence and 
improvement of a modem economic system is the existence of appropriate 
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, which afford stability and 
predictability to the parties operating in the system" 
Indeed, some states seem to have already begun to question the value of 
remaining party to the ICSID Convention. In May 2007, Bolivia withdrew from 
the ICSID Convention, urging other Latin American countries to do the same.
15 
Emmanuel Gaillard, writing in the international co1mnercial arbitration sphere, 
notes that the concern over inconsistent decisions is even more important in 
arbitration given that there is generally no ability to substantively review 
awards. 16 This is also true of the investment treaty arbitration field.
17 
B Procedural l11ejjicie11cy 
The practice of not consolidating similar claims also results in procedural 
delays within the system. In the 36 years since the first claim was submitted to 
ICSID,18 153 claims have been concluded,
19 leaving another 120 still pending.
20 
i:i ee for example, Charles N Brower, Charles H Brower and Jeremy K Sharpe "The Coming 
Crisis in the Global Adjudication System" (2003) 19 Arb lnt 415. 
14 Hirsch , above n 6, 2. 
15 Damon Vis-Dunbar, Luke Eric Peterson and Fernando Cabrera Diaz "Bolivia Notifies World 
Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions" (9 May 2007) International Institute 
for Sustainable Development: Investment Treaty News, available at www.bilaterals.org (accessed 
9 August 2008); Jonathan C Hamilton , Sabina Sacco, Stephen Ostrowski, Mairee Uran-Bidegain, 
Monica Fernandez-Fonseca, Javier Ferrero and Rafael Llano Oddone "Treaty Developments 
Related to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela" (2007) International Disputes Quarterly 6, available 
at www.whitecase.com (accessed 9 August 2008). See also, M omarajah "A Coming Crisis: 
Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration" in Sauvant, above n 10, 39. 
16 Emmanuel Gaillard "The Consolidation of Arbitral Proceedings and Court Proceedings" 
(2003) ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin - pecial Supplement 35, 36. 
17 Under the ICSID Convention there are only limited grounds for review of awards: Convention 
on the ettlement oflnvestment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (18 March 
1965) 575 UNTS 159, art 52 [ICSID Convention]. See Part II C The ICSID System at Present. 
18 Holiday Inns SA & ors v Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No ARB/72/1, which was 
registered on 13 January 1972. 
19 ICSID website "List of Concluded Cases", above n 2. 
20 ICSID website "List of Pending Cases", above n 2. 
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A prime example of procedural delay can be seen in the recent wave of cases 
submitted in the wake of the Argentine Fiscal Crisis. These cases have, by and 
large, proceeded individually, despite raising similar factual and legal issues. The 
recent wave of arbitrations again t Argentina highlights the need for ICSID to 
develop a framework for dealing with similar arbitrations in a more efficient and 
cost-effective manner. As two commentators have noted: 21 
The investment dispute arbitration system is still in an incipient phase and 
the cases against Argentina are testing the ability of !CS! D to deal with a 
multitude of disputes involving the same country, with many disputes arising 
out of the same measures. 
C The ICSID System at Present 
Presently in ICSID there is no institutional consolidation. There is, despite 
the lack of any institutional incentives, some voluntary consolidation between 
claimants. For example, in Sue::, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, 
and InterAguas Servicios Integrates de/ Agua SA v Argentine Republic,22 three 
related claimants chose to pursue their respective claims together. This case of 
voluntary consolidation is also interesting in that two of the claimants were 
Spanish, while the third was French. This meant that the case also involved two 
different BITs.23 
Hanotiau also notes that the ICSID Secretariat ha developed a practice of 
recommending that the same arbitrators be appointed in cases raising similar 
issues, and attempting to harmonise procedures with a view to reaching "in 
practice a result that is as close to consolidation as possible."24 However, the 
21 R Doak Bishop and Roberto Aguirre Luzi "Investment Claims: First Lessons from Argentina" 
in Todd Weiler (ed) International Im ·estment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Lall' (Cameron May Ltd , 2005, 
London) 425, 425. 
22 Sue::, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Sen•icios Integrales de/ 
Agua SA "A1gentine Republic (Jurisdiction) ICSID Case o ARB/03/ 17 (IC ID, 2006, Salacuse 
P, Kaufornnn-Kohler & Nikken) [Sue:: and fnterAguas Se11'icios]. 
21 Ibid , para 2. 
24 Bernard Hanotiau Complex Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-issue and Class 
Actions (Kluwer Law International , TI1e Hague, 2005) para 419 . TI1is practice will be considered 
further at Part X A Appointment of the ame Tribunal. 
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writer questions how close is "as close ... as possible" when inconsistent 
decisions continue to occur on a relatively frequent basis, and the majority of 
cases proceed individually. 
The ICSID framework has recently undergone review and reform. In 
October 2004 a discussion paper on possible improvements to the ICSID 
framework was released. 25 This was followed by a Working Paper on 12 May 
2005.26 Finally ICSID implemented revised Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) as of I O April 2006.27 The potential for a 
consolidation mechanism in ICSID was not debated in the process of these 
amendments. 
The annulment procedure under ICSID does not provide a means to 
challenge decisions based on inconsistency with a previous decision. This is 
because the circumstances in which an award may be annulled are strictly limited 
by the ICSID Convention. Article 52 of the Convention allows for awards to be 
annulled for certain procedural, but generally not for substantive, reasons. 28 
D Appropriate Cases for Consolidation 
It should also be noted in this overview that cases may be appropriate for 
con olidation in two different situations. Firstly, one may consolidate where the 
cases all arise out of the same event or sequence of events. Secondly, 
consolidation may be appropriate where, although arising from different factual 
circumstances, the cases all raise a common question of law.29 
25 ICSID Discussion Paper, above n 4. 
26 IC ID ecretariat "Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations" (Working Paper, 
12 May 2005) [ICSID Working Paper]. 
27 Lntemational Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes "Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules)" ( I O April 2006) available at 
www.icsid.worldbank.org (accessed 7 August 2008) [ICSID Arbitration Rules]. 
28 
Christoph II Schreuer The ICSID Com ·ention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 200 I) art 52. 
29 This distinction is considered further : Part VI B The Basis upon which Claims May be 
Consolidated. 
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Ill INCONSISTENT DECISIONS IN ICSID 
Several recent cases, both in ICSID, and in investment treaty arbitration 
generally, have demonstrated the problem of inconsistent decisions arising from 
the lack of any institutional mechanism for consolidation. The most notorious of 
these decisions are the CME30 and Lauder31 cases. Given the volume of writing 
on CME and Lauder and the focus of this paper on the ICSID framework, this 
paper will not consider these cases, and will instead take examples from within 
ICSID. The paper will therefore consider two sets of cases. Firstly, the cases of 
LG&E32 and CMS, 33 which arose out of the Argentine Fiscal Crisis, will be 
considered. Secondly, the paper will discuss the SGS cases: SGS v Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan34 and SGS v Republic of the Philippines. 35 Both sets of 
cases present examples of inconsistency in ICSID tribunal decision-making, 
despite raising similar factual and legal questions. They therefore present 
scenarios in which consolidation could have been a possibility, and illustrate why 
the question of introducing a consolidation mechanism has arisen in the ICISD 
framework. 
A LG&E and CMS 
l The Argentine Fiscal Crisis36 
The recent wave of arbitrations against Argentina in ICSID anse 
primarily out of emergency measures adopted by the Argentine Government 
between 2001 and 2002. These measures were designed to alleviate the effects 
1° CME (Partial Award), above n 12; CME (Final Award), above n 12. 
31 lauder, above n 12 . 
32 LG&E Energy COip, LG&E Capital Co,p and LG&E International Inc ,, Argentine Republic 
(Liability) ICSID Case No ARB/02/ 1 (ICSID. 2006. de Maekelt P. Rezek & van den Berg). 
33 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Republic of Argentina (Award) (2005) 44 ILM 1205 (ICSID. 
2005, Orrego Vicuna P. Lalonde & Rezek) ; CMS Gas Transmission Co,, Argentine Republic 
(Annulment) ICSID Case o ARB/01 /8 (JC ID, 2007, Guillaume P. laraby & Crawford). 
34 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA V Islamic Republic qf Pakistan (Jurisdiction) 8 
ICSID Rep 383; (2003) 42 JLM 1290 (IC ID, 2003, Feliciano P, Faures & ll10mas) . 
35 SGS Societe Generale de Swwil/ance SA ,, Republic of the Philippines (Juri sdiction) 8 ICSI D 
Rep 515 (JCSID, 2004, El-Kosheri P, Crawford & Crivellaro). 
16 A detailed discussion of the Argentine Fiscal Crisis is outside the scope of thi s paper. For 
more in formation see for example. Christina Daseking, Atish Ghosh. Timothy Lane and Alun 
Thomas Lessons(rom the Crisis in A1gen1ina (lntemational Monetary Fund. Washington DC. 
2004). 
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of an economic crisis, which has been described as "worse than the US Great 
Depression". 37 This paper does not seek to analyse the nature and causes of the 
economic cns1s. Suffice to say that the actions taken by the Argentine 
government in response to the worsening economic climate resulted in losses to 
foreign investors, hence the wave of arbitrations submitted to ICSID. The 
majority of cases currently pending before lCSID against Argentina relate to the 
withdrawal of the right in investment agreements for investors to calculate tariffs 
in US dollars and then convert them into pesos at the time of billing. 
Two often cited cases, LG&E and CMS, present an example of where 
cases presenting similar factual and legal issues have given rise to different 
decisions by separate tribunals. Indeed, the facts of these two cases were, in all 
material respects, identical. 38 The inconsistency in these cases is all the more 
surprising given that one arbitrator, Judge Francisco Rezek, sat on both tribunals. 
The tribunals in LG&E and CMS largely agreed on the substantive 
violations of investment law alleged by the investors in both cases. Where they 
diverged was on Argentina's attempted defence of necessity to these violations. 
In both cases, Argentina argued that it was excused from its responsibilities 
under the BITs by the defence of necessity under both the BIT and customary 
international law. 
2 Necessity in LG&E and CMS 
In both CMS and LG&E, Argentina invoked the fundamental 
international law principle of necessity as a defence to its alleged breaches of the 
BIT.39 In CMS the Tribunal rejected the defence, 40 whereas the Tribunal in 
LG&E accepted it in part.41 
17 
Alan Cibils "IC ID Bleeds Argentina" (2005) Mulitnational Monitor, available at 
www.allbusiness.com (accessed 26 Jw1e 2008). 
38 
Stephan W Schill "International Investment Law and the I-lost State ' s Power 
to I land le Economic Crises Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E" Argentina" (2007) 24 
J lnt Arb 211,214. 
19 CMS (Award). above n 33, para 304. 
40 Ibid, para 331 . 
41 LG&E, above n 32 , para 226. 
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The CMS Tribunal rejected Argentina's defence of necessity on two 
principal grounds. Firstly, it held that the measures taken by Argentina to abate 
the crisis were not the "only way" for Argentina to safeguard its essential 
· 42 mterests. It secondly considered that Argentina had contributed to the state of 
necessity43 and therefore, m accordance with the International Law 
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility (the ILC Draft Articles),44 
and customary international law, rejected the defence. 45 The Tribunal in LG&E, 
in contrast, found that between 1 December 2001 and 26 April 2003 the crisis in 
Argentina necessitated the measures it took to protect its "essential security 
interests".46 Argentina was therefore excused from observing its obligations 
under the BIT during this period.4 7 
The tribunals also approached their analysis of the law of necessity from 
different angles. The CMS Tribunal relied firstly on the law of necessity under 
customary international law, which is expressed in Article 25 of the ILC Draft 
Articles. 48 It looked to the provisions of the BIT as a secondary source of the 
law. 49 The LG&E Tribunal, on the other hand, considered the hierarchy of 
sources of law to be considered by the Tribunal to be as follows: "first the 
Bilateral Treaty; second and in the absence of explicit provisions therein, general 
international law, and third, the Argentine domestic law . . . ". 50 Therefore, 
contrary to the CMS Tribunal, the Tribunal in LG&E took the provisions of the 
BIT as its primary source of law, and used customary international law merely to 
. l . 51 support its cone us1ons. 
42 International Law Commission " Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts" 
(12 December 2001) A/56/10, art 25( 1 )(a) [ILC Draft Articles] ; CMS (Award), above 11 33 , para 
323. 
43 CMS (Award), ibid, para 329. 
44 ILC Draft Articles, above 11 42, art 25. 
45 CMS (Award) , above n 33, para 331 . 
46 LG&E, above n 32, para 226. 
47 Ibid ; Schill, above n 38, 266. 
48 CMS (Award) , above n 33, paras 315-331 . 
49 Ibid , paras 353-382. 
50 LG&E, above n 32, para 99. 
5 1 Ibid , paras 206 and 245 . 
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There are two mam points of substantive difference between the 
application of necessity in the LG&E and CMS cases: the question of the burden 
of proof for the elements of necessity, and the question of compensation to the 
investor for measures taken whilst in the state of nece ity. 52 This paper does not 
seek to comment or draw any conclusions on which of the approaches in the e 
cases was the better one. 53 It uses them instead, as examples of fundamentally 
conflicting decisions within the ICSID framework. 
(a) Burden of Proof 
The two tribunals diverged on which pa1iy they thought must discharge 
the burden of proving the constituent elements of the defence of necessity. The 
CMS Tribunal placed the burden of proving that no alternative measures 
exi tcd, 54 and that the state did not contribute to the state of necessity,55 on the 
host state. The Tribunal in LG&E took the opposite approach, requiring the 
inve tor to prove these elements. On this approach, the investor must 
pecifically prove that there were other, less damaging, ways by which the host 
state could have abated the crisis. 56 
(b) Compensation 
The Tribunal in CMS considered that compensation would be due to the 
investor even where the BIT violation was justified by the state of necessity. 57 
The Tribunal in LG&E, however, considered that the consequence of a finding of 
a state of necessity was that no compensation was available to the investor for 
damage caused by the measures taken during that state of necessity. 58 
52 Schill, above n 38, 266. 
5
' For academic discussion on this point, see for example, chill, above n 38, 280-286; William 
W Burke-White "The Argentine Financial Crisis: Stale Liability Under B!Ts and the Legitimacy 
of the ICSID System" (2008) University of Pennsylvania Law School Paper 202, available at 
http: lsr.nellco.org (accessed 9 August 2008). 
54 ILC Draft Articles, above n 42, art 25( 1 )(a). 
55 Ibid, art 25(2)(b). 
56 LG&E, above n 32, paras 242 and 256. 
57 CMS (Award), above n 3" , paras 383 and 390. 
58 LG&E, above n 32. para 264. 
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The Tribunal in CMS, on the question of compen ation, applied Aliicle 
27(b) of the ILC Draft Article , which provides that the invocation of the defence 
of necessity "is without prejudice to : (b) The question of compensation for any 
material lo s caused by the act in question. " 59 Having failed to establish 
necessity, the Tribunal concluded that Argentina was required to compensate the 
investor. Given its reliance on Article 27(b), it presumably would have found the 
same had the defence of necessity been made out. 
The LG&E Tribunal on the other hand concluded that it was the investor 
that must bear the losses incurred during the state of necessity. 60 It came to thi 
conclusion by taking the provi ions of the BIT, which did not mention 
compensation, and noting the unspecific nature of Article 27(b) of the ILC Draft 
Articles. It therefore concluded that the answer to the question of compensation 
was sufficiently provided for in the absence of any similar provision to Article 
27(b) in the BIT.61 Because the BIT contained no similar provision to that in 
Article 27(b), the investor was entitled to no compensation for measures taken 
during the state of necessity. 
3 The Ramifications of these Decisions 
With almost 40 pending arbitrations ansmg out of the emergency 
measures taken by Argentina in 2001-2002, these divergent decisions have had, 
and will have, an impact on other tribunals ; in many ea e , a tribunal may have 
to choose one approach over the other. Both investor , and the Argentine 
Republic, are affected by these decisions. Given the fundamental difference in 
the application of the law of necessity, it is impossible for partie to future 
disputes to predict, with any degree of certainty, the outcome of their claim . 
Despite the striking imilarity of the facts in MS and LG&E, the tribunal 
in LG&E did not overtly con ider the decision of the tribunal in CMS when 
discussing the application of the defence of necessity. The Tribunal in LG&E 
59 ILC Draft Articles. above 11 42, art 27(b): CMS (Award), abo,e 11 33. para 383. 
60 LG&E, above 11 32, para 264. 
61 Ibid. paras 260-26 1. 
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only referenced the CMS decision in its discussion on fair and equitable 
treatment,62 and the effect of the umbrella clause. 63 The LG&E Tribunal did not 
acknowledge that it was diverging from the approach of the CMS Tribunal with 
respect to the defence of necessity and ignored the CMS decision in its discussion 
of necessity. Stephan Schill notes that, "it is objectionable to use precedent in 
such a selective way. " 64 
(a) CMS Annulment 
On 8 September 2005, Argentina filed for annulment of the CMS award 
under Articles 52(l)(b)65 and 52(l)(e)66 of the ICSID Convention. 67 While the 
Annulment Committee considered that the Tribunal had erred in its application 
of the law of necessity, it did not consider that the case fell within the grounds 
for annulment. 68 In criticising the CMS Award, the Annulment Committee 
essentially adopted the reasoning of the LG&E Tribunal as to the approach of the 
Tribunal to the ILC Draft Articles and the BIT, 69 and as to compensation. 70 This 
situation is complicated further by the fact that two subsequent tribunals 
established under ICSID in the cases of Enron, 71 and Sempra 72 have followed 
CMS and concluded that the defence of necessity is not available to Argentina. 
This leaves both the law, and future claimants, in an uncertain position. Finally, 
on 19 September 2008, the ICSID Secretariat registered an application for the 
institution of annulment proceedings in LG&E. 73 
62 Ibid, para 125. 
6
' Ibid, para 171. 
64 chill, above n 38, 285. 
65 I ID Convention. above n 17. art 52( I )(b) provides for challenge where a tribunal has 
manifestly exceeded its powers . 
66 Ibid. art 52( I )(e) provides for challenge where a tribunal fails to state the reasons upon which 
an award is based . 
67 CMS (Annulment). above n 33. 
68 Ibid. para I 50. 
69 Ibid , paras 134-135. 
70 Ibid , para 146. 
7 1 Enron Co,p & Ponderosa Assets LP ,, Argentine Republic (Award) ICSID Case o ARB/01 /3 
(IC ID. 2007. Orrego Vicuna P. van den Berg & Taschanz). 
72 Sempra Energy International I' Argentine Republic (Award) IC ID Case o ARB 02/16 
(IC ID. 2007. Orrego Vicuna P. Lalonde & Rico) . 
71 ~ 
IC ID website. above n 2. 
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B The SGS Cases 
The SGS cases concerned the interpretation of umbrella clauses. The 
umbrella clau e is a clause in a BIT, which essentially has the effect of elevating 
contractual claims to treaty claims. 74 Umbrella clauses come in many forms and 
are not included in all BIT . 75 The umbrella clause in the UK Model BIT for 
example is worded as follows: "Each contracting Party shall observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party."76 Many other versions also cxi t, 
which has been one of the reasons for the uncertainty surrounding the meaning 
and effect of these clauses. 
Indeed, the effect of umbrella clauses has been the subject of much 
academic debate. 77 This essay does not seek to outline or contribute to that 
debate. The writer uses the SGS cases simply as an illustration of the effects of 
not consolidating similar claims. One issue for both of the SGS tribunals was a 
jurisdictional one, based on the correct effect of an umbrella clause: does it 
transform the breach of contract into a breach of treaty, or does the breach remain 
one of contract?78 The disputes in these two cases arose from similar factual 
scenanos. 
/ SGS v Pakistan 
In SGS v Pakistan, an ICSID tribunal was called on to determine whether 
it had jurisdiction to decide SGS 's claims based on either the BIT, the contract, or 
both.79 This Tribunal was the first to con ider the effect of an umbrella clause. 
74 Anthony C Sinclair "The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the Lntemational Law of 
Investment Protection" (2004) 20 Arb lnt 411 , 41 2. 
75 Notable Model BITs, which do not contain w11brella c lauses, include the ri Lanka Model BIT, 
the China Model BIT III Compendium III 251, and the Chile Model BIT Ill Compendiwn I II 
143. 
76 United Kingdom Model BIT, art 2. 
77 For a usefu l survey of the different possible interpretations of umbrella clauses see Katia 
Yannaca-Small " Lnterpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements" in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development International !111·estment Lall': 
Understanding Concepts and Tracking !nnomtions (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2008) IOI . 
78 SGS 1• Pakistan, above n 34, para 132(e); G 1° Philippines, above n 35, para 92(b). 
79 SGS 1• Pakistan, ibid, para 146. 
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SGS argued that the umbrella clause meant that breaches of contractual 
commitments also amounted to infringements of the BIT. 80 Pakistan argued that 
claim under the umbrella clause were "second order" claims, meaning that such 
claim would only "ripen" once a determination had been made as to whether the 
contract had been breached.81 Pakistan's argument was that the ICSID tribunal 
did not have the jurisdiction to make this "first order" detem1ination. 
82 
The Tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear SGS's claims 
arising under the BIT, but not those arising from the contract.
83 
They held that 
SGS could not use the umbrella clause to '"elevate' its claims grounded solely in 
a contract with another Contracting Party ... to claims grounded on the BIT."
84 
They based this decision on a textual interpretation of the umbrella clause, and an 
analysis of the intentions of the parties. 85 This approach was also accepted and 
applied in Joy Mining v Egypt. 86 
2 SGS v Philippines 
With respect to the issue of the scope of the umbrella clause, a great deal 
of the reasoning in the SGS v Philippines Tribunal is in direct contradiction to the 
opinion of the SGS v Pakistan Tribunal. 87 
The tribunal in SGS v Philippines concluded that an umbrella clause could 
convert a breach of contract into a violation of the BIT. 88 They qualified this, 
however, by saying that the BIT tribunal should only exercise this jurisdiction 
where there is no choice of forum mechanism in the underlying contract. 89 
80 Ibid. para 165. 
81 Ibid . para 54. 
2 Ibid . 
8
' Ibid. paras 155 and 162. 
84 Ibid . para 165. 
85 Ibid. paras I 66- I 67. 
86 Joy Mining Machinery Ltd, , Arab Republic of Egrpt (Jurisdiction) (2004) 19 ICSID Rev-FILJ 
486 (IC ID. 2004. Orrego Vicunna P. Weeramantry & Craig). 
87 Em manual Gaillard " Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over Contract Claims 
the SGS Cases Considered" in Todd Weiler (ed) International lm·estment Lall' and Arbitration: 
leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and C11stoman · International Lall' 
( ameron May Ltd. London. 2005) 325. 330. · 
88 SGS 1· Philippines. above n 35. para 128. 
9 Ibid . 
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These conflicting decision , along with subsequent decisions which 
provide equally conflicting results, 90 have made it unclear exactly what the effect 
of an umbrella clause in a BIT is. This has resulted in heated academic debate, 
and uncertainty in the international investment arena. 9 1 
IV CONSOLIDATION 
The term "consolidation" is used here to mean the grouping of arbitrations 
where the requests for arbitration were ubmitted for determination 
independently. 92 This section will describe how consolidation is effected in 
domestic legal systems and in international commercial arbitration. These areas 
are taken as illustrations of consolidation, as the ability to consolidate may be 
seen as central, or at least important, to the continued operation of these systems. 
A Consolidation in Domestic Legal Systems 
Consolidation in domestic legal systems has a long history. In England, the 
Court has a broad power to consolidate under the Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 
3.1 (2)(g).93 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Rules of 
Court determined when cases could be consolidated .94 
90 See for example, El Paso Energy International Co. "Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) IC ID 
Case o ARB/03/15 (lCSID, 2006, Caflisch P, tern & Bernadini) ; Sa/ini Costru//ori SpA and 
Ita/strade SpA ,, Hachemite Kingdom of Jordan (Award) (ICSID, 2006, Guillawne P, Cremades 
& inclair) ; Joy Mining, above n 86; Eureka BI', , Republic of Poland (Partial Award) (Ad Hoe 
Arb Trib, 2005, Fortier P, Schwebel & Rajski) ; Noble Ventures Inc" Romania (Award) IC ID 
Case No ARB/01/11 (ICSID, 2005, Bockstiegel P, Lever & Dupuy) ; Siemens AG,, Argentine 
Republic (Award) IC ID Case No ARB/02/8 (IC ID, 2007, Rigo Sureda P, Brower & Bello 
Janeiro). For a useful summary of the different positions adopted by tribunals ee Gaillard 
" Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over Contract Claims t11e G Cases 
Considered", above n 87. 
91 See for example Gaillard, ibid . 
92 Bernard Hanotiau explains that the term "consolidation" can have a wider meaning in t11e 
United States: 1 lanotiau, above n 24, para 402. 
9
' Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), r 3.1(2)(g). 
94 RSC Ord 4 r 9 (revoked); Ha/shury 's Lm,·.\· of England (5ed 2008 Reissue, Butterworilis, 
London, 2008) vol 37 (reissue), Practice and Procedure, para 131. 
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An example of the u e of consolidation in England under the Rules of Court 
can be seen in Payne v British Time Recorder Co Ltd and WW Curtis Ltd,95 where 
it was decided that it wa appropriate to join the two defendants in the one action. 
This case was one in which an action was brought against two different 
defendants on different contracts.96 Scrutton LJ commented on the discretionary 
power of the court under this Rule: 97 
Broadly speaking, where claims by or against different parties involve or may 
involve a common question of law or fact bearing sufficient importance in 
proportion to the rest of the action to render it desirable that the whole of the 
matter should be disposed on at the same time the Court will allow the joinder of 
plaintiffs or defendants, subject to its discretion as to how the action should be 
tried. 
It was argued in this case that there must be some link between the 
defendants, or that the damage to the plaintiffs must be common to both of them 
in order to consolidate proceedings. This was rejected by the Court. 98 The case 
was described as being "very near the line."99 This is because different questions 
were raised between the plaintiff and each of the defendants. However, the Court 
considered that because the central question of the case was common to both 
claims, "the rest of the case is mere fringe." 100 This case illustrates the broad 
power of domestic courts to order consolidation. 
The American Law Institute is currently reviewing the law of aggregate 
litigation in the United States. The Institute notes that the "central purpose of 
aggregation is to promote the efficient use of litigation resources in the pursuit of 
justice under law." 101 
Most domestic legal systems therefore have a framework whereby claims 
of a similar nature may be consolidated. This paper will use an example from the 
95 [1921] 2 KB I (CA). 
96 Ibid, 9 Lord Stemdale MR. 
97 Ibid, 16 Scrutton LJ. 
98 
Ibid 10 Lord temdale MR. 
99 Ibid. 11 Lord Stemdale MR. 
100 Ibid . 
10 1 
ll1e American Law Institute " Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation" Discussion Draft 
o 2 (6 April 2007). Draft~ l.03(a). 
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ew Zealand domestic legal y tern as an illustration of contemporary 
consolidation. 
J An Example: the New Zealand Domestic Legal System's Approach to 
Consolidation 
In the New Zealand domestic legal system, proceedings are consolidated 
under Rule 382 of the High Court Rules. The Court has a wide discretion 
conferred by Rule 382(c) to order consolidation if "for some other reason it is 
desirable" to do so. 102 More specifically, Rule 382 provides for the Court to 
make an order if the cases present a common que tion of law or fact, 103 or if the 
relief claimed relates to the same event and/or transaction, or series of events 
and/or transactions. 104 Once a ground for consolidation in Rule 382 is made out, 
the Court then has discretion to order or not to order consolidation of the 
proceedings on the terms that it thinks fit. 105 Rule 383 concerns the application 
of Rule 382 and makes it clear that the relief sought need not be the ame in all 
cases for an order of consolidation to be made. 106 
Medlab Hamilton Ltd v Waikato District Health Board107 is a recent ew 
Zealand case that considered the relevant factors that may be taken into account 
when determining a consolidation order under the wide di cretion of Rule 382. 
Factors, which will favour consolidation of proceeding , include "the savings 
that will be achieved in time and cost to the partie ... and removing the risk of 
· · d · · ,, 108 mcons1stent ec1s1ons . Rodney Hansen J al o considered the saving m 
judicial resources to be a factor weighing in favour of consolidation. 109 
This section has hown that consolidation in domestic legal proceedings 
is relatively straightforward. The courts in domestic legal y terns have a broad 
102 I ligh Court Rules (NZ), r 382(c); Medlab Hamilton Ltd,, Waikato District Health Board 
(2007) 18 PRNZ 517, para 8 (HC) Rodney Hansen J. 
10
·
1 High Court Rules ( Z), r 382(a). 
104 Ibid, r 382(b). 
105 Ibid, r 382. 
106 Ibid, r 383(a). 
107 Medlab, above n I 02. 
108 Medlab, ibid, para 8 Rodney I lansen J. 
109 Ibid. 
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power to con olidate similar, or related, proceedings on the basis of similar 
questions of law or fact. There is less flexibility in arbitration, and consolidating 
claims is more difficult because of the consensual basis of the submission to 
arbitration. 110 This is the principal difference between consolidation in domestic 
legal systems and consolidation in arbitral proceedings: domestic legal systems 
may consolidate claims regardless of the parties ' lack of consent, whereas 
consent is generally required in arbitral proceedings. The motive for 
consolidation may also be slightly different in domestic legal systems, as 
consolidation often serves to save court time and re ources regardless of any 
such savings, or otherwise, to the parties. 
B Co11solidation i11 Iutematio11al Commercial Arbitration 
Consolidation is a central feature of the international commercial 
arbitration regime due to the nature of modern international business transactions. 
One estimate uggests that one third of International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) arbitration cases involve multi-party disputes. 111 The most common 
instance of consolidation m international commercial arbitration 1s m 
international construction projects. These projects involve not only the employer 
and the main contractor, but also sub-contractors and suppliers with whom the 
main contractor will have agreements implementing the head agreement. 112 
Because of the inter-relationship of these partie , it is often important for the 
effective resolution of disputes that related claims are able to be consolidated. 
The difficulty is that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over a party generally rests on 
that party's consent to the arbitration. 
There are several different instances in which claims may be consolidated 
m international commercial arbitration: multiple claims arising out of a single 
contract; multiple claims arising out of eparate contracts; multiple claims arising 
out of a ene of contract involving different partie ; or consolidation of 
110 
Alan Redfern and Martin I lunter Lall' and Practice c?f ln1erna1ional Commercial Arhitration 
(3ed, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 1999) 175. 
111 
Oa\ id Joseph QC Jurisdiclion and Arhitra1ion Agreemen/.\ and their Enforcement (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2005) para 4 .62 citing the I AAA I ID Join t Colloquiw11 (Paris, 19 
No\ember 2004). 
112 Redfern and llunter. above n I 10, 177. 
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different arbitrations between the same parties. The focus of this ection will be 
on multi-party arbitrations arising out of different contracts, and involving several 
partie , as this is the most comparable category to the inve tment treaty 
arbitration realm. Similar proces e , such as joinder of third parties, have a 
similar effect to consolidation, but in the interest of brevity, will not be 
considered here. 
J Consolidating Claims 
Consolidation of separately commenced arbitral proceedings may occur in 
several ways. Firstly, the arbitration agreement may contain a consolidation 
clause. This is rare and is not recommended by any of the leading arbitration 
institutions. 11 3 A more common way to achieve con olidation i by express 
agreement between the parties. The problem with expre agreements is that 
often at least one party will not see consolidation as beneficial to their ea e. The 
second means of consolidation is via the arbitration rules where they include 
provision for consolidation. 114 Exactly how such consolidation is effected 
depends on the particular rules. Finally, in the ab ence of agreement between the 
parties to consolidate in any of the above forms, con olidation may occur where 
arbitration laws provide for statutory consolidation. Statutory con olidation 
prov1s1ons are rare as they conflict with the fundamental principle of party 
. b. . 11 5 TI .:: h h I d . I II autonomy m ar 1trat1on. 1ere1ore, w ere uc aw o exist, t 1ey norma y 
also require the consent of the partie . 11 6 
11 1 Julian D M Lew QC, Loukas A Mistelis and tefan M Kroll Comparati\'/! International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The llague, 2003) 392 and for more 
information on the difficulties of drafiing such a clause see 392-396. 
114 See for example, the Belgian Centre for Arbitration and Mediation (Cc.PA l) Rules, art 11 ; 
Rules of the wiss Chambers of Commerce, art 4; Rules of the lntcmational Chamber of 
Commerce, art 4 .6. For more in formation see I lanotiau. above n 24. paras 404-412 . 
11 5 Lew, Mistelis and Kroll , above n I 13, 397. 
11 6 Ibid. One notable exception to this is the etherlands Arbitration Law, art 1046. 
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(a) Consolidation by Consent 
Difficulties generally anse because of the consensual nature of 
arbitration, which means that all parties must agree to arbitration. 117 While there 
may be benefits to consolidating proceedings, the reality is that there is generally 
one party that opposes consolidation. 118 David Joseph notes that it is possible, 
although rare, that the parties will agree to con olidate their claims after a dispute 
has arisen, mainly because parties will, at this stage, have their own interests in 
mind. 119 It is therefore more likely that consolidation will be effected by the 
rules agreed between the parties in the arbitration agreement. 120 
(b) Consolidation under Arbitration Rules 
Some institutional arbitration rules provide for consolidation of related 
disputes. While under the ICC Rules, consolidation is only possible if the parties 
to the disputes are the same, 121 the CEPA I Rules provide for consolidation 
where the parties are not the same. 122 The CEPANI Rules also allow for the 
decision on consolidation to be taken without the parties' consent. 123 One 
limitation of this method is that in order to consolidate, all arbitrations must be 
conducted under the same rules. 
The CITRAL Arbitration Rules are currently under revision by the 
CITRAL Working Group on International Arbitration and Conciliation. 124 
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules at present, there is no provision for 
consolidating claims except with the consent of all parties. A consolidation 
11 7 
See for example, Go, ·ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain v Boeing Co 998 F 2d 
68 (2d Cir 1993) rejecting an earlier Court of Appeal decision that allowed consolidation despite 
objections by one of the parties: Compania Espana/a de Petroleos SA ,, Nereus Shipping SA 527 
F 2d 966 (2d Cir 1975). 
11 8 
Martin Platte "When hould an Arbitrator Join Cases?" (2002) 18 Arb Int 67, 71 . 11 9 
Joseph. above n 111 , para 4.64. 
120 Ibid. 
12 1 
Rules of the lntemational Chamber of Commerce, art 4 .6. 
122 
CEPANI Rules, above n I 14, art 12. ee also Hanotiau, above n 24, para 410. 123 CEP A I Rules, ibid. art I 2. 
124 
ll1e current rules were adopted in 1976. A copy may be downloaded from the UNCITRAL 
website, www.uncitral.org (accessed 5 eptember 2008). For the reports of the Working Group 
see the CITRAL website " Working Group II" www.uncitral.org (accessed 5 September 
2008) . 
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provision was originally propo ed in the Working Group's proposal for the new 
Rules. 125 The UNCITRAL Working Group subsequently concluded that a 
consolidation provision in the revised Rules "might not be necessary". 126 
However, a provision on joinder of third parties to proceedings is included in 
proposed Rule 15( 4): 127 
The arbitral tribunal may. on the application of any party, allow one or more third 
persons to be joined in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to 
the arbitration agreement and has consented to be joined. The arbitral tribunal may 
make an award in respect of all parties so involved in the arbitration. 
This proposed Rule is still being discussed by the Working Group. The joinder of 
the third party would not be dependent on the agreement of all of the parties to 
the arbitration. 128 This situation was considered to be defensible because "insofar 
as parties agreed to arbitration under rules containing the proposed joinder 
provision, they would have consented to the voluntary jo inder of a third party." 129 
( c) Consolidation under Arbitration Laws 
National courts also have the power, in some instances, to order 
consolidation of arbitral proceedings. The con ent of the parties is generally a 
prerequisite. 130 Some countries have enacted legislation allowing for 
consolidation regard Jess of whether the parties consent or not. 131 An example of 
such a provision is the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure. 132 Hong Kong law 
125 Jan Paulsson and Georgios Petrochilos "Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules" 
commissioned by the UNCITRAL Secretariat (2006) para 131. 
126 United Nations Commission on lntemational Trade Law "Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitration and Conciliation on the Work of its Forty- ixth ession" (20 March 2007) 
NC .9/619, para 120 [UNCJTRAL Forty- ixth ession Report] . 
127 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II (Arbitration) 
"Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Note by the 
Secretariat" (6 August 2008) NC .9 WG .ll/WP. 151. art 15(4) . 
128 UNCITRAL forty-Sixth ession Report. above n I 26, para I 22 . 
129 Ibid. 
1:io See for example. Boeing Co. above n 117 rejecting an earlier Court of Appeal decision that 
allowed consolidation despite objections by one of the parties: Nereus Shipping. above n 117. 
ee also, I Ianotiau. above n 24. paras 413-418. 
1
'
1 See for example, Arbitration Act 1982 (llong Kong). s 6B. 
112 Code of Civil Procedure 1986 (The etherlands). art 1026. 
29 
also allows for court-ordered consolidation irrespective of the parties' consent 
where the parties adopt the rules for domestic arbitration. 133 
Court-ordered consolidation under national laws 1s limited to 
circumstances where both arbitrations are conducted in the same state. There are, 
of course, problems with this approach with respect, especially, to party 
autonomy. Indeed, the English Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration 
Law considered whether to include a provision allowing court-ordered 
consolidation into the English Arbitration Act 1996. The Committee concluded 
that while the parties could agree to consolidation between themselves, 134 
allowing for consolidation regardless of the will of the parties "would amount to a 
negation of the principle of party autonomy". 135 
It is therefore only where both arbitrations are conducted pursuant to the 
same institutional rules that allow for consolidation without consent, or where the 
arbitrations take place in a country whose laws allow for consolidation without 
consent, that consolidation may occur without the consent of the parties. 136 
2 Benefits and Detriments of Consolidation in International Commercial 
Arbitration 
The consolidation of proceedings in international commercial arbitration 
can have substantial benefits to the parties. Consolidation can save the parties 
costs and time, allow for the tribunal to assess the situation giving rise to the 
dispute in an all encompassing manner, 13 7 and avoid conflicting decisions. 
However, consolidation in international commercial arbitration can also be 
disadvantageous. For example, lack of consent to consolidate and allegations of 
113 Arbitration Act 1982 (Hong Kong), s 68. 
114 Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 35. 
rn United Kingdom Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law "Report on the 
Arbitration Bill by the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law" (February 1996) 
para 180. 
116 
Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The I !ague, 1999) para 521. 
1.17 Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 113,378. 
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unequal treatment may be grounds for refusing enforcement of the award under 
the ew York Convention. 138 
3 Other Ways of Minimising the Problems of Multi-Party Arbitration in 
International Commercial Arbitration 
Given that consolidation in international commercial arbitration hinges, in 
most cases, on the agreement of the parties, international commercial arbitration 
has sought other ways to minimise the potential problems of not consolidating 
related arbitrations. One such method has been to appoint the same arbitrators to 
determine the different arbitrations, which has been adopted by some arbitration 
rules. 139 A potential problem arises with this solution where the parties have the 
power to appoint their own arbitrators. 140 
Another way of dealing with this problem that has been advanced is 
through concurrent hearings. Provision for concurrent hearings has even been 
included in some arbitration rules. 141 A procedure known as de facto arbitration, 
which is where two or more cases are heard simultaneously and by the same 
arbitrators, but separate awards are rendered, is also available under some 
systems. 142 
Tribunals may also order a stay of arbitral proceedings until a decision 
has been delivered in the first case. 143 Subsequent tribunals may then take 
account of the first decision, helping thus to avoid inconsistent decisions. The 
138 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (10 June 1958) 
330 UNTS 38, art V( I )(d) relating to the consent of the parties to the arbitral procedure. For a 
comprehensive discussion see Lew, Mistelis and Kroll , above n 113, 408-409 . 
139 See for example, the Zurich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, art 13. 
140 This problem was illustrated by the Dutco case in the French Cour de cassation: Siemens AG 
and BKMI lndustrienlagen GmbH v Dutco Construction Co (7 January 1992) Bull. Civ., I, no 2. 
See also Eric A Schwartz "Multi-party Arbitration and the ICC In the Wake of Dutco" ( 1993) 
10 J Int Arb 5. 
141 See for example, the London Maritime Arbitrators Association Rules, art 14(b). 
142 IJ1temational Commercial Arbitration Act 1989 (Au tralia) . See also Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development International inl'estment Perspecti1'es (OECD 
Publishing, Paris, 2006) 227. 
143 See for example, I 'olt information Sciences, Inc 1• Board of 1rustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
Uni,·ersity (1990) XV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 131 . 
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problem with this option, however, 1s that it can lead to more delays m the 
resolution of disputes. 144 
To sum up on consolidation in international commercial arbitration, 
consolidation is an important element of this system but is, except in a limited 
number of exceptional circumstances, dependent on the parties ' consent. 
V CONSOLIDATION IN OTHER AREAS 
This section will now consider how similar claims are consolidated in two 
other areas: in mass claims processes, and under NAFTA. It will then compare 
these frameworks with the current situation under ICSID and analyse the 
differences between them. 
A Mass Claims Processes: the UNCC 
Those in the arena of mass claims processes have long realised the value 
of consolidating claims. One of the most ambitious mass claims processes in 
tenns of consolidating a large number of claims was the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (the UNCC). The UNCC was established in 1991 by 
the United Nations Security Council. 145 The purpose of the UNCC was to assess 
claims for damage arising out oflraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and 
the subsequent occupation of Kuwait until 2 March 1991. 146 The Commission 
was presented with over 2.6 million claims, the largest workload of any mass 
claims commission to date. 
The UNCC i regarded as having pioneered many of the techniques used 
in the processing of mass claims. 147 Article 38(a) and (b) of the Provis ional Rules 
144 
Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 1 13, 404. 
145 
UNSC Resolution 687 (3 April 199 1) SIRE /687/1991. 
146 
For an overview of the events of the Iraqi in vasion of Kuwait see for example Abu Baker 
I lamzah !nl'Osion o(K1nmi1 by Iraq 1990 (Media Cend iakawan. Kuala Lumpur, 199 1 ). 
147 
Howard M 1-loltzmann and E:dda K.ristjansdottir (eds) fnlenwlional Mass Claims Processes: 
Legal and Practical Perspect i1 ·e.\ (Oxford Uni,ersity Press, ew York, 2007) 244. 
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for Claims Procedure 148 encouraged the adoption of procedural mechanisms to 
aid in resolving the claims before the Commission. The Executive Secretary and 
Secretariat staff maintained a computerised database of all claims received. 149 
Based on the legal, factual and valuation information, similar claims were 
classified into six different categories, 150 and processed together. This process 
was said to be to "facilitate the work of the Commissioners and to ensure 
uniformity in the treatment of similar claims." 151 
The Panel of Commissioners generally determined the common legal 
issues surrounding a set of claims first, and then addressed any legal questions 
raised by cases with specific fact pattems. 152 Compensation, for those claimants 
that satisfied the criteria for compensation, was then assessed individually, the 
levels of which were contained in an annex. 153 
I The Catego,y "E" Claims 
This paper will look at a case from the Category "E" claims as the writer 
sees these claims as being the most factually similar to those advanced under 
ICSID. Category "E" claims could be brought by corporations, private legal 
entities or public sector enterprises. 154 These claims included claims relating to 
"construction or other contract losses; losses from the non-payment for goods or 
services; losses relating to the destruction or seizure of business assets; lo s of 
profits; and oil sector losses." 155 
148 United ations Compensation Commission Governing Council "Provisional Rules for Claims 
Procedure (VT) (26 June 1992) S AC.26/1992 I 0; ( 1992) 31 ILM I 053 [ CC Provisional 
Rules]. 
149 Ibid, art 34( I) . 
15° For more information on the categories of claims see, United ations Compensation 
Commission www2 .unog.ch uncc (accessed 2 August 2008) [UN website]. 
151 UNCC Provisional Rules, above n 148, art 17. 
152 See for example, United Nations Compensation Commission "Report and Recommendations 
made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fourteenth Instalment of"E2" Claims" ( 18 
September 2003) S/AC.26/2003/21 , Part lll [The E2 Fourteenth Instalment] . 
153 See for example, the E2 Fourteenth Instalment, ibid Annex III. 
154 UNCC website "Category "E" Claims", above n 150. 
155 Ibid. 
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(a) An Example: The Fourteenth Instalment of "E2" Claims 
The writer takes the "Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of 
Commissioners Concerning the Fourteenth Instalment of "E2" Claims" as an 
example. 156 This report, and related "E2" reports, will be used to comment on the 
consolidation practices of the UNCC. "E2" Claims are claims filed on behalf of 
non-Kuwaiti Corporations and Other Business Entities ( excluding those from the 
oil sector, construction/engineering and export guarantee claims). 157 
The Fourteenth Instalment dealt with 229 claims filed largely on behalf of 
corporations operating in the import-export trade. 158 The claimants ranged from 
28 different countries. These claims were selected to be grouped together by the 
Secretariat on the basis of three principal criteria: "(a) the date of filing with the 
Commission, (b) the claimant ' s type of business activity, and (c) the type of loss 
claimed." 159 
Due to the large number of claims submitted to the Commission, the 
Secretariat played an important role in evaluating and classifying claims in the 
first instance. For example, in the Fourteenth Instalment of "E2" claims, the 
Secretariat conducted a preliminary assessment of the claims in order to 
detem1ine if they met the formal requirements set down in Article 14 of the 
Rules. 160 Secondly, a preliminary review of all the claims was then conducted by 
the Secretariat, and expert consultants appointed by the Secretariat , to detennine 
if any additional information or documentation would be needed by the Panel of 
Commissioners in deciding the claims. 16 1 
In deciding the claims, the Panel further divided the claims into 
subcategories reflecting their fact pattems.162 The Panel provided a brief 
description of the claim in each subcategory, followed by an analysis of the 
156 Th e E2 Fourteenth In stalment, above n 152. 
157 UNCC website "Category "E" Claims", above n 150. 
158 The E2 Fourteenth In stalment, above n 152, para 2. 
159 Ibid, para 2. 
160 Ibid , para 6. 
161 Ibid , para 8. 
162 Ibid , Part III . 
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relevant law. The evidentiary requirements for compensation, and the criteria 
used to determine the level of individual compensation, were then established for 
each subcategory. 163 The level of compensation for each individual claimant was 
set out in Annex Ill. 164 
2 Can this Model Apply to Arbitrations under JCSJD? 
The first important difference between these two models is the nature of the 
UNCC:16s 
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribw1al before which the parties 
appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of 
examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments 
and resolving disputed claims. It is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial 
function may be involved. 
This is largely because the liability ofI raq for damage arising out of its invasion, 
and occupation, of Kuwait was established by the Security Council, 166 and 
expressly accepted by Iraq. 167 The UNCC therefore did not have to assess the 
issue of liability for loss in claims brought before them. This highlights an 
important characteristic of mass claims commissions, which is that they are 
generally not charged with determining the liability of the parties. 168 In fact, by 
definition, mass claims commissions deal with the consequences, not the causes 
of the conflict. 169 This is an imp011ant difference to the ICSID system, which 
must deal with both of these issues. 
163 Ibid, see e,pecially para 36. 
164 Ibid, Annex Ill. 
165 United ations Secretary-General "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 
of Security Council Resolution 687 ( 1991 )" (2 May 1991) S/22559. para 20. 
166 UNSC Resolution 687 (8 April 1991) RES/687/1991, paras 16 and 33. 
167 lraq expressed its acceptance of the provisions of Resolution 687 in tl1e following letters: (6 
April 1991) S/22456; (JO April 1991) S/22480; and (23 January 1992) S/23472. 
168 The one notable exception is the Eritrea Ethiopia Claim Commi ion: ritrea Ethiopia Claims 
Commission Jus Ad Bel/um Ethiopia's Claims 1-8 (Partial Award) (2006) 45 ILM 430. 
169 See for example, Hans Das "The Concept of Mass Claims and ilie Specificity of Mass Claims 
Resolution" in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed) Redressing 
Injustices Through Mass Claims Processes: lnnomtil •e Responses to Unique Challenges (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 2006) 3, 5. 
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The trade-off necessary to complete the Commission ' s work can be seen in 
the following comment by the Panel of Commissioners: 170 
... the Panel must keep in mind the reality that the vast nwnber of claims before 
the Commission require the adoption of legal standards and valuation methods 
that are administrable and that carefully balance the twin objectives of speed and 
accuracy. Only by adopting such an approach can the thousands of category "E" 
claims that have been filed with the Commission be efficiently resolved. 
Indeed, m the UNCC, the Panels generally assessed claims in the abstract, 
dealing with the factual patterns, but rarely commenting on specific cases. 17 1 
This is due to the large amount of cases the Panels were required to decide in 
each instalment. An ICSID tribunal would not have such a high number of 
claims before it, and could therefore be more specific in its analysis. However, 
the experience of the UNCC shows that it is possible to decide legal aspects of 
claims in the abstract. 
The trade-off, or perhaps more precisely balancing exercise, described 
above is not generally necessary in investment treaty arbitration. The reason for 
consolidation in mass claims processes seems to be more one of necessity, 
because of the large number of claims submitted to these institutions. 172 The 
number of claims means that the institution has no choice but to adopt a 
collective approach to the processing of claims. 173 Although the number of 
claims submitted to I CSID is on the rise, 174 it is nowhere near the number usually 
required before a process is considered a "mass claims process". 175 The rationale 
for consolidation in the ISCID system has more to do with efficiency and the 
desire to avoid the risk of conflicting decisions than it does with necessity. 
170 United ations Compensation Commission "Report and Recommendations made by the Panel 
of Commissioners Concerning tJ1e First Instalment of"E2" Claims" (3 July 1998) 
S/AC.26/1998/7, para 40. ee also, Das, ibid, 5. 
17 1 S fi ee or example, the E2 FourteentJ1 Instalment, above n 152, Part III. 
172 Holtzmann and Kristjansdottir, above n 147, 22. 
m Das, above n 169, 7. 
174 ee Part I Introduction. 
175 Das, above n 169. 7. 
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On the other hand, one could argue that while the motivations for 
establishing the bodies are not the same, the necessity for some form of 
consolidation in ICSID still remains, a it experiences an increasing number of 
claims brought to it for determination. 176 If the principal aim of consolidation in 
ICSID is viewed as procedural economy then some parallels may be drawn with 
the mass claims commission framework. The difference between these 
frameworks is that while procedural economy may be seen as desirable under 
ICSID, it is a necessity under mass claims processes. 
The Secretariat played an important role in the UNCC in rece1vmg, 
evaluating, and classifying claims. A parallel may be able to be drawn with the 
ICSID Secretariat. While the Secretariats obviously play different roles because 
of the caseload that their institution is charged with, the ICSID Secretariat has, in 
recent years, begun to take more of an active role in the assessment of claims. 177 
Finally, whereas in the mass claims arena, "practical justice" 178 is 
accepted as necessary given the volume of claims submitted to these institutions, 
parties to investment treaty arbitrations would be unlikely to accept such justice. 
An example of this "practical justice" can be seen in the fact that the UNCC 
assessed claims on the basis of fact patterns, not the individual facts of each 
claim. 179 
In conclusion, claims in mass claims commissions are consolidated on the 
underlying basis of procedural economy driven by necessity, as opposed to any 
desire for consistency in decisions rendered. If consolidation were introduced in 
ICSID with the aim of achieving procedural economy, mass claim comm1ss1ons 
may provide a useful parallel. 
176 ee Part I Introduction. 
177 For an example of such a practice see Part X A Appointment of the Same Tribunal. 
17 David D Caron and Brian Morris "The United Nations Compensation Commission: Practical 
Justice, ot Retribution" (2002) 13 EJIL 183, 188. 
179 ee Part VA I (a) A.n Example: TI1e Fourteenth Instalment of"E2" Claims. 
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B NAFTA 
AFTA wa signed by Canada, Mexico and the United States in 1992 
and came into force on 1 January 1994. 18° Chapter 1 I of AFTA concerns 
investments and gives an important role to arbitration in the settlement of 
investment disputes. Under these provisions, claims by investors of a NAFT A 
party against another AFT A party may be submitted to arbitration for 
detem1ination. 181 The possibility for overlapping claims was addressed in 
NAFTA by Article 1126 on consolidation, 182 which has been described as "an 
unusual and innovative provision." 183 
The success of the AFTA consolidation prov1s1on can, m part, be 
illustrated by the number of subsequent treaties and regimes that have adopted 
similar consolidation provisions. Processes similar to the consolidation process 
m AFT A have been adopted by several subsequent Free Trade Agreements 
(FT As), including the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). 184 
Similar consolidation processes have also been included in the 2004 US Model 
BIT. 
185 
The most recent FT As signed by the United States have added an extra 
requirement to the consolidation provision. While the NAFT A provision applies 
where the arbitrations have "a question of law or fact in common", 186 more 
recent FT As also require that the arbitrations "arise out of the same events or 
circumstances". 187 
180 
North American Free Trade Agreement ( 17 December 1992) l 07 Stat 2057; CTS 1994 No 2; 
(1993) 32 ILM 289 [ AFTAJ. 
181 Ibid , art 1120. 
182 Ibid, art 1126, see Appendix One. 
18
' I lenri C Alvarez " Arbitration Under the orth American Free Trade Agreement" (2000) 16 
Arb Int 393 , 413 . 
184 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFT A) (28 May 2004) (2004) 43 ILM 514, art 
l 0.25. Other FT As to adopt similar consolidation procedures include the United States - Chile 
Free Trade Agreement (6 Jw1e 2003) (2003) 42 ILM 1026, art 10.24, United States - Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement ( 15 June 2004) (2004) 118 Stat l l 03: (2005) 44 ILM 544, art l 0.24, and 
the Canada - Chile Free Trade Agreement (5 December 1996) ( 1997) 36 ILM 1135, art G-27. 
185 United States Model BIT 2004, art 33. 
186 NAFT A, above n 180, art l 126(2). 
187 
ee for example. United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, above n 184, art 10.24, United 
tates - Morocco Free Trade Agreement, above n 184, art 10.24 and Dominican Republic 
Central America United States Free Trade Agreement (DR- AFTA) (5 August 2004) (2004) 
Pub L o 109-53: (2005) 119 tat 462 : (2004)43 !LM 514.art 10.25. 
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1 Article 1126 
Article 1126 provides for the consolidation of claims by a consolidation 
tribunal where, firstly, the cases raise a common issue of law or fact and, 
secondly, consolidation is " in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the 
claims". 188 If one of the parties requests consolidation, a tribunal of three 
arbitrators is appointed by the Secretary-General ofICSJD within 60 days. 189 lf 
the tribunal concludes in favour of consolidation, they then as ume jurisdiction 
over all or part of the claims, 190 or one or more of the claims where it believes 
that the detennination of that or those claims would aid in the resolution of the 
other claims. 191 Consolidation may not be ordered ex officio; it must be 
requested by one of the parties. 
2 Conflicting NAFTA Consolidation Decisions 
In 2005, two NAFT A consolidation cases discussed the standard for 
consolidation under Article 1126. 192 These decisions contradict each other on 
the standard they require for consolidation. 
(a) Corn Products 
The first decision, Corn Products, 193 in May 2005, rejected a request by 
Mexico to have two claims by American companies consolidated. The American 
companies claimed that an excise tax imposed by Mexico on soft drinks 
containing high fructose corn syrup breached several provisions of NAFT A. 194 
The Consolidation Tribunal acknowledged that the cases had "a question of law 
188 NAFT A, above n 180, art 1126(2). 
189 Ibid , art 1126(5). 
190 Ibid , art l l 26(2)(a). 
191 Ibid, art I 126(b). 
192 Corn Producls Intemational Inc,. United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/1 and 
Archer Daniel Midland Co and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc,, United Mexican States 
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/5 (Consolidation) (NAFT N ICSID (AF), 2005, Cremades P, Ravi ne 
& Siqueiros); Canfor Co1p ,, United States of America, Tembec et al,, United States of America, 
Te1minal Forest Products Ltd v United States of America (Consolidation) (NAFTA, 2005, van 
den Berg P, de Mestral & Robinson). 
193 Corn Products, ibid. 
194 The claimants alleged breaches of AFTA, above n 180, arts 1102 ( ational Treatment), 
1106 (Performance Requirements) and 1110 (Expropriation); ibid, para I. 
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or fact in common" 195 but did not believe that consolidation would be "in the 
interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims". 196 In considering the 
fairness and efficiency of consolidating the claims, the Tribunal concluded that 
"the risk of unfairness to Mexico from inconsistent awards ... cannot outweigh 
the unfairness to the claimants of the procedural inefficiencies that would arise in 
I'd · d' ,,197 conso I at1on procee mgs. These procedural inefficiencies included the 
difficulties of keeping information confidential from one another, given that the 
. . . · I 98 parties were m compet1t1on. 
(b) Ca11(or 
In September of the same year, a NAFT A consolidation tribunal 
considered a request from the United States to consolidate three claims made by 
Canadian companies against it. 199 The claimants were three Canadian softwood 
lumber companie . Their claims arose out of countervailing duty and anti-
dumping measures adopted by the United States, which affected the Canadian 
companies concerned, and allegedly breached several NAFTA provisions. 200 
According to the Can/or Consolidation Tribunal, the main purpose of the 
consolidation provision in AFTA was to promote "procedural economy".20 1 
This was a concern especially in respect of state parties.202 The Tribunal 
concluded that procedural economy pointed in favour of consolidation of the 
claims. 203 
The Ca11(or Tribunal co1m11ented on the importance of avoiding 
conflicting decisions in the investment treaty arbitration realm: 204 
195 NAFTA, ibid, art 1126(2); Corn Products, ibid , para 6. 
196 AFT A, ibid, art 1126(2); Corn Products, ibid, para 9. 
197 Corn Products, ibid, para 17. 
198 Ibid, paras 7-9. 
199 Canfor, above n 192. 
200 
The claimants alleged breaches ofNAFTA, above n 180, arts 1102 (National Treatment), 
1103 (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), and 1110 
(Expropriation). 
201 Canfor, above n 192, paras 73-76. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid, para 220. 
004 Ib 'd I 13 - 1 , para ., . 
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The desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions is not limited to cases where 
the parties are the ame. Cases with di fTerent parties may present the same 
legal issues arising out of the same event or related to the same measure. 
Conflicting results then may take place if the findings with respect to those 
issues di fTer in two or more cases. 
(c) The Differences between Can/or and Corn Products 
The conflicting decisions of Canfor and Corn Products are important in 
NAFT A jurisprudence for their affect on the application of Article 1126. 
Whereas the tribunal in Corn Products thought that the oppo ition of the 
claimants to consolidation was relevant,205 the tribunal in Canfor con idered that 
this factor would be irrelevant in most cases. 206 The Can.for tribunal al o 
considered the fact that the claimants were competitors to be irrelevant,207 
whereas this was an important factor in deciding not to consolidate the claims in 
Corn Products. 208 Indeed, if the Corn Products reasoning were followed, cases 
involving claimants in competition with each other who oppose consolidation 
would very rarely be consolidated. 209 According to Can/or "the factors of time 
and cost would usually cancel one another out, since consolidation will usually 
save the state party both time and money, and increase the investors' 
expenditures of both. "2 '° Finally, the Can/or Tribunal considered the avoidance 
of conflicting decisions as a factor that must be taken into account.211 This factor 
clearly favours consolidation once the first requirement (of a common question 
of law or fact) is satisfied. 
205 Corn Products, above n 192, para 12. 
206 Canfor, above n 192, paras 78-80 and 135. 
201 Ibid, para 138. 
208 Corn Products, above n 192, paras 7-9. 
209 Daniel Bodansky " Interna tional Decisions: The 2005 Activity of the AFT A Tribunals" 
(2006) 100 AJIL 429, 433. 
2 10 Ibid . 
2 11 Canfor, above n 192, paras 131 - 133 . 
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3 Distinguishing Features.from Investment Treaty Arbitration 
The most obvious difference in NAFT A, compared with investment 
treaty arbitration, is that under AFT A, all of the disputes arise under the same 
treaty. In investment treaty arbitration, the disputes can, and most commonly do, 
arise from a number of investment agreements and BITs. In this later scenario, 
consent to consolidation cannot be found in the consent to the Treaty, as is the 
ea e in the AFT A context. 
Henri Alvarez note that given the special nature of arbitration claims 
under AFT A, "some compromise of the principles of private arbitration may be 
justified."212 Arbitral proceedings under NAFTA are not based on consent as is 
traditionally and nonnally the case in arbitration. NAFT A provides arbitration as 
ofright to investors that fall within the provisions of AFT A. It is not necessary 
that there be an investment contract or agreement to arbitrate.213 Conversely, 
consolidation under NAFTA can still be viewed as the product of the consent of 
the parties. 214 The state's consent derives from its acceptance ofNAFTA and the 
investor's consent from its decision to invest in a AFT A country. 
One lesson that can be learnt from the AFT A context by ICSID is that, 
in developing a consolidation framework, one should be more clear as to what 
the objectives of consolidation are. Otherwise, the uncertainty and inconsistency 
found in some arbitral awards is just replicated at a higher level. 
VI FRAMING THE ISSUE 
In light of the preceding analysis, it is necessary to draw some 
di tinctions before proceeding to consider consolidation with respect to the 
JCSID framework. The need for consolidation may arise from several scenarios 
and be sought for several reasons. This section aims to outline and distinguish 
212 Ah·arez, above n 183, 414. 
211 Ibid . 
214 
ee for example, Antonio Crivellaro "Consolidation ofarbitra l and court proceedings in 
in\'estment disputes" in Bernardo M Crcmades and Julian D M Lew Parallel State and Arbitra/ 
Procedures in international Arbitration (IC Publishing. Paris, 2005). 
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the different rea on for con olidating claim , and the different bases upon which 
claims may be consolidated. 
A Reasons for Consolidating 
Due to the lack of any institutional consolidation mechani m in ICSID, it 
is quite possible that a host tate will face multiple claims arising out of the ame 
event, or sequence of events. There are two concerns with thi and it i 
submitted that the e concerns must be treated eparately. The first is the 
possibility of inconsistent deci ions. The econd i the concern over procedural 
inefficiency. There seems, therefore, to be two main rea on to consolidate 
claims: as a means of achieving consi tency and a a mean of achie ing 
procedural economy. These reasons may co-exi t m any given et of 
circumstances, for example in the claims arising out of the Argentine Fi cal 
Crisis. It is not necessarily the case, however, that both reasons will alway be 
present. 
J Consistency 
One fundamental rea on for con olidating claim may be the de ire to 
avoid the possibility of tribunals rendering incon istent decision . The danger of 
this has been illustrated by several cases, including LG&E21 5 and 'MS,216 and 
the SGS cases. 217 While the arbitral sy tern doe not operate on a principle of 
stare decisis, inconsistent decisions are till unde irable a they call into que tion 
the legitimacy of the system and threaten the future acceptance of it by the 
· · 218 part1c1pants. 
2 15 LG&E. above n 32 . 
2 16 CMS (Award). above n 33; C!v/. (Annulment). above n 33 . 
2 17 SGS, , Pakistan. abO\e n 34; SC , , Philippinl!1. abO\e n 35. 
218 ee for example. Brower. Brower and Sharpe. above n 13; llirsch. above n 6. 2; Franck "Do 
In vestment Treaties I la\e a Bright Future"'. above n 3. 66. 
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2 Procedural Economy 
Another principal rea on for consolidating claims is the desire to achieve 
procedural economy. Procedural economy was considered to be the underlying 
basis of Article 1126 of AFTA by the Consolidation Tribunal in Canfor.219 
This consideration is often one that is advanced by the state party. However, 
ICSID, as an institution, also has an interest in promoting procedural economy, 
given the recent rise in claims submitted to it for detem1ination. Without some 
focus on achieving procedural economy, the determination of c laims will take 
longer than the parties deem to be acceptable, which could result in a loss of 
confidence in the system. 
B The Basis upon which Claims May be Consolidated 
A set of claims may be appropriate for consolidation, in two distinct 
ituations: when they arise out of the same event, and when they arise out of 
different events but give rise to similar legal issues. 
1 Arising out of the Same Event 
Claims may be appropriate for consolidation where they arise out of the 
same event or factual circumstances. It is not therefore necessary that 
consolidated claims always involve a similar question of law. Article 1126 of 
AFT A provides for consolidation where there is "a question of law or fact in 
common". Subsequent treaties that have adopted a AFT A-style consolidation 
provision have added an extra requirement. For example, the US Model BIT 
now provides for consolidation where there is a "question of law or fact m 
common" and the claims "arise out of the ame events or circumstances". 220 
Given that the focu of consolidation proceedings arising out of the same 
event is not nece sarily on the existence of a common question of law, the 
underlying reason for consolidation in this area seems to be the de ire for 
219 See Part VB (b) anfor. 
no United tales Model BIT 2004, art 33( I). 
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procedural economy. This conclusion i supported in the AFTA context by the 
d . . . C r, 221 ec1s10n 111 an_1or. 
2 Concerning the Same Legal issue 
Claims may also be consolidated where they all give rise to the same 
legal issue, but do not arise from the same event, or serie of events. In the 
domestic realm, the e cases are often brought in the form of test cases or class 
action suits. A test case aim to test a previously untested, or unpopular, area of 
law in order to set a precedent for future ea es.222 A class action aims to resolve 
a large number of claims efficiently and consistently. 223 
The category of consolidation that consolidates claim based on imilar 
legal issues seems to be more focused on ensuring that like claim are decided 
alike, or in other words, ensuring consistency of the law within the system, as 
well as saving court resources, which is always a concern in domestic system . 
3 Evaluation 
The Argentine claim essentially fall into both of these categories, a they 
all arise out of the Argentine Fiscal Crisis, and most give rise to similar legal 
issues. The SGS cases,224 on the other hand, are an example of where the claim 
could have been consolidated on the basi that they gave rise to the same legal 
issue, regardless of the fact that they arose from different events. 
22 1 Canfor, above n 192, paras 73-76. 
222 Test cases often occur in the context of mass tort claims. ee for example, the asbestos cases 
in the United States: David Friedman "More Justice for Less Money" ( 1996) 39 J L & Econ 211; 
Robert G Bone "Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process 
Scarcity" (1993) 46 Vand L Rev 561; Michael J aks and Peter Da id Blanck "Justice Improved: 
the Unrecognised Benefits of Aggregation and ampling in the Trial of Mass Torts" ( 1992) 44 
tan L Rev 815. ll1e term is also used to describe a case brought with the aim of changing not 
only the law, but also social nonns. One of the most famous example of this is Brown 11 Board of 
Education (1954) 347 US 483; 74 Ct 686. 
221 Howard M Erichson "Mississippi Class Actions and the lne\ itability of Mass Aggregate 
Litigation" (2005) 24 Mississippi ollege Law Review 285,296; dward F herman "Consumer 
lass Actions: Who are the Real Winners'1" (2004) 56 Maine Law Review 223, 224. 
224 SGS 1· Paki.1wn. above n 34; SGS 1• Philippines. above n 35. 
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In the writer's view, it is the type of consolidation based on the same 
events that ICSID should focu on. Consolidating claims based on procedural 
economy poses less of a challenge to the ICSID framework than does promoting 
consistency of decisions. Procedural economy can be seen as being consistent 
with the traditional arbitral benefits of speed and efficiency. On the other hand , 
introducing a system of consolidation to ensure consistency of decisions within 
ICSID, or investment treaty arbitration generally, fundamentally questions the 
framework of arbitration as a consensual, party-specific institution binding only 
the parties that have con ented to be bound . 
C The Origin of the Claims 
There is one final distinction that must be highlighted regarding the origin 
of the claims that are to be consolidated. This distinction arises from the 
fragmented nature of investment treaty arbitration. 
On the one hand , related claims may arise out of the same treaty. The 
quintessential example of this in the modem investment treaty arbitration field is 
claims arising out of AFT A. This situation does not raise any issues, as 
consolidation is provided for in the Treaty. 
Multiple claims may also arise out of the same BIT. Where there is a 
consolidation clause in the BIT, consolidating claims according to the tenns of 
the treaty will not be a problem. Many recent Model BITs have introduced 
consolidation clauses, for example, the 2004 US Model BIT.225 Even where 
there is no consolidation clause in the treaty at issue, it seems easier to 
consolidate claim arising out of the same treaty, as the provisions at issue, in a 
legal sense, will be the same. 
A different set of claims are those that arise under different BITs. An 
example of this can be seen in the famous CME and Lauder ea es: CME 
commenced arbitration under the 1991 BIT between the etherlands and 
225 United States Model BIT 2004, art 33. 
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Czechoslovakia,226 whereas Lauder proceeded under the 1991 BIT between the 
United States and Czechoslovakia. 22 7 Consolidating claims that arise under 
different BITs raises more difficulties than consolidation under FT As such as 
NAFT A, or the same BIT. The Argentine cases in ICSID blur this distinction to 
some extent, as the majority of claims in fact arise under the BIT between the 
United States and Argentina. 
VII DOES CONSOLIDATION PROVIDE UNEQUAL BENEFITS? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look at consolidation 
from both the investor's and the state's perspective. 
A From the State Perspective 
The consolidation of claims brings substantial benefits, in terms of 
procedural economy, to the state party. From this point of view, establishing 
consolidation provisions may make ICSID more attractive to those states yet to 
, · 228 
JO 111. 
In some circumstances, it may be that consolidation is not a practical 
benefit to a state. For example, from a tactical perspective, it may be in 
Argentina's interests to delay the determination of investors' claims in the hope 
that some investors will simply give up. A state may also ee a benefit in arguing 
each case separately, as they can learn from early decisions and develop different 
arguments in an attempt to avoid liability. 
B From the Investor Perspective 
Consolidation is perceived as bringing Jess benefits, and indeed perhaps 
putting further burdens on investor parties. Investor parties must now collaborate 
in advancing their claims and may need to make more effort to, for example, keep 
226 CME (Partial Award), above n 12; CME (Final Award), above n 12. 
227 Lauder, above n 12. 
228 Currently 143 states have ratified the I ID Convention: ICSID website, above n 2. 
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certain information confidential from each other if they are in direct competition. 
These difficulties are especially pronounced if one investor is a relatively small 
investor with a small, straightforward claim. If that investor's claim is then 
consolidated, it is likely that resolution will in fact take longer than it would have 
. 1·d . 2,9 pnor to conso 1 at1on. -
However, despite the apparent inequality of benefits of consolidation in 
favour of the state pa1iy, the investor also has an interest in consolidation, or at 
least in promoting consistency in arbitral decisions. Investors rely on past arbitral 
decisions as a guide to conduct, rights and liabilities in the investment 
relationship.230 Inconsistency in arbitral decisions therefore leads to uncertainty 
in the practical investment relationship, resulting in a lack of predictability, 
reliability and clarity. 231 IC SID also has an interest in promoting consistency, for 
a legal system in which inconsistent decisions are allowed to foster brings the 
law, and the system, into disrepute. A system that is brought into disrepute in this 
way, will not last long.232 
The introduction of a consolidation procedure could, on this analysis, have 
negative effects for the ICSID framework. Membership of ICSID is often used 
by states to attract foreign investment, for investors perceive their investment to 
be safer if they have direct recourse to an arbitral body in the event of a dispute. 
If a consolidation framework, which is perceived as unfavourable to investors, is 
introduced, membership of ICSID may lose its attractiveness, and foreign 
investment may suffer. This would be an undesirable consequence from the point 
of view of states also . 
229 ee for example, Crivellaro, above n 214, 113; Gaillard "The Consolidation of Arbitral 
Proceedings and Court Proceedings", above n 16, 37; Part VII C Efficiency and Cost-
Effectiveness. 
BO Franck "Do Investment Treaties Ilave a Bright Future", above n 3, 57. 
rn Ibid, 63. 
232 
Ibid, 66. See also Michael D Goldhaber "Wanted: a world investment court; All-powerful 
global institutions may be out of fashion. But, as recent arbitration rulings show, they may be 
exactly what the world needs" (2004) 26 American Lawyer SS26(5). 
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Consolidation can also be seen as a benefit to the investor in some 
circumstances, as it may in fact lend more weight to their claim if, for example, 
several parties present the same expert evidence. 
Finally, there may also be practical reasons, unrelated to the respective 
benefits of consolidation, that lead an investor party to oppo e consolidation. For 
example, an investor may have strong loyalties to their legal counsel. In 
situations like the Argentine cases, where there are over 40 investors seeking 
compensation from Argentina, investors may also perceive the chance of getting 
their compensation paid as more likely if they pursue their claim on their own. 
C Balancing the Interests 
The writer believes that while it is generally perceived that consolidation 
favours the state party to the arbitration, there are clear benefits of consolidation 
to the investor also, and the scales of convenience may therefore tip in favour of 
consolidation for both parties to an arbitration, if the circumstances are 
appropriate for consolidation. 
The OECD Investment Committee considered the issue of consolidation 
in international investment disputes. There was no consensus in these discussions 
that ''the advantages of consolidation provisions in investment agreements 
exceeded its disadvantages." Katia Yannaca-Small note that the "consent of the 
parties as a prerequisite for a request for consolidation and concerns about 
confidentiality still weighed strongly against the advantage of this measure. " 233 
VIII SPECIFIC PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE IN CONSOLIDATION 
UNDERICSID 
A The Co11se11sual Nature of Arbitration 
The apparent distaste for consolidation in ICSID, and investment treaty 
arbitration in general, results from a number of factors. The most important of 
2
" Katia Yannaca- mall " Improving the ystem of Investor- tate Dispute ettlement : The 
OECD Government's Perspecti\e" in au\·ant, above n 10. 223. 
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these is the contractual nature of the consent to arbitration, which is regarded as 
the "cornerstone" of the tribunal 's jurisdiction. 234 This consensual aspect of 
arbitration means that it is difficult , if not imposs ible, to join non-parties to the 
arbitration in the absence of agreement. 235 
B Choice of Arbitrators 
Under the ICSID Convention, and general arbitral practice, one of the 
principal benefits of arbitration is that the parties choose their own arbitrators. 236 
This right could be sacrificed if cases are consolidated. Under NAFTA, if 
consolidation is ordered, the consolidation tribunal (appointed by the Secretary-
General of ICSID)237 assumes jurisdiction over the cases. 23 8 The arbitrators 
chosen by the parties are thus not the same arbitrators as those who decide the 
case. 
One possible so lution to the problem of how multiple parties could come 
to an agreement on appointing a single arbitrator could be to pass the 
responsibility for appointing arbitrators to ICSID, instead of giving this right to 
the parties.
239 
This would involve amending the ICSID Convention itself, as 
Article 37 of the Convention provides for the right of the parties to appoint an 
arbitrator each in the absence of express agreement to the contrary. 240 As is noted 
below,
24 1 
amending the Convention is a difficult task as it requires the agreement 
f II . ?4? o a contractmg states. - -
rn IC ID Convention. above n 17. art 3( I); Hirsch. above n 6. 47 ; David J Branson and W 
Michael Tupman" electing an Arbitra l Forum: A Guide to Cost- EfTective International 
Arbitration" ( 1984) 24 Vi rginia Journa l o f International Law 9 I 7. 92 I. 
2:\5 I lanotiau. above n 24. para 2. 
2
·
16 IC ID Convention. above n 17, art 37. 
217 
AFT A, above n 180, art I 126(5). 
218 Ibid, art 11 26(2). 
219 
ll1is opti on fits with the opinions of some commenta tors that " the right to nominate an 
arbitrator need not be treated as sacrosanct" so long as the parties are treated eq uall y: Platte, 
above n I 18, 75. 
240 
ICSID Convention, abo\e n 17. art 37(2)(b). 
241 
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242 
IC ID Con\'ention. above n 17. art 66. 
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C Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness 
Arbitration i generally viewed as more efficient than domestic legal 
proceedings. From the state party's per pective, thi benefit would be increa ed 
by consolidation. From the investor's perspective, however, consolidating claims 
may actually cause delays and increase procedural difficultie associated with 
coordinating its claim with another party. 243 
Enunanuel Gaillard ra1 es a potential 
consideration: 244 
cenano that warrant 
"it may we ll be that one of the parties involved is only concerned about 
obta ining an award on a specific point with respect to which the facts are 
establi shed. 1n separate proceedings on this question, it may receive an award 
quickly, while consolidated proceedings, involving the discussion of other. 
possibly more complicated, issues may take substantially longer." 
This cou ld give rise to increased costs for the investor parties in consolidated 
investment treaty arbitrations, especially with respect to legal coun el fees. Thi 
could be remedied by allowing parties that have no intere t in one particular part 
of the arbitration, to be excused from being present. However, the problem of 
delay in delivering the award in consolidated proceedings seem unable to be 
remedied . 
In terms of costs, any institutional arbitration ystem propo mg to 
introduce rules of consolidation would need to con ider how the fee and other 
co ts related to the arbitration would be apportioned between the parties. 
D Confidentiality 
Arbitral proceeding are generally held in private. Thi pre ent 
substantial benefits to commercial parties concerned with protecting commercial 
secret , or commercially sensitive information. Consolidating proceeding 
24
' ee for example, Corn Product.\ . above n 192, para . 
244 Gaillard "TI1e onsolidation of Arbitral Proceedi ngs and Court Proceedings", above n 16. 37. 
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presents a danger then, especially between parties m commercial competition, 
that commercially ensitive information will be released to the other party. This 
was a concern for the Consolidation Tribunal in Corn Products. 245 
The move towards transparency in ICSID proceedings, introduced 
primarily in the 2006 amendments to the JCSJD Arbitration Rules, may have 
begun the process of fu1ding methods to ensure confidentiality whilst allowing 
third-party participation.246 For example, Rule 32, as amended, allows for 
circumstances in which third parties may attend arbitral proceedings.247 The Rule 
also provides that " [t]he Tribunal shall ... establish procedures for the protection 
of proprietary or privi leged infonnation." 248 This Rule relates to third parties 
however, and applying such procedures as between disputing parties may create 
concerns over due process. If ICSID can develop mechanisms to protect 
confidential information m consolidated proceedings, the concern over 
confidentiality will be substantially alleviated. Some mechanisms that have been 
advanced by commentators and actors within ICSID in the context of 
consolidation include paiiially separate hearings in camera, appointment of a 
confidentiality advisor, and arbitral orders restricting access. 249 
The Tribunal in Can/or noted that: "in many international arbitrations, 
parties negotiate and execute an appropriate confidentiality agreement among 
themselves". 250 Implementing confidentiality agreements may therefore not be 
such a difficult process in ea es of consolidated claims. The Tribunal also noted 
that cases g iving rise to due process concerns over confidentiality would be 
rare_2s1 
245 
Corn Products, above n 192. paras 7-9. 
246 I S ID Arbitration Rules, above n 27. 
24 7 Ibid , r 32. 
248 Ibid , r 32(2). 
249 
OECD International !111 ·estmen1 Perspecti1 ·es, above n 142. 237. 
1 511 • Cw?for. above n 192. para 143. 
25 1 Ibid, para 147. 
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E The Fragmented Nature of Investment Treaty Arbitration 
While consolidation may promote procedural economy, establishing a 
consolidation procedure in ICSID will not completely remedy the problem of 
inconsistent decisions in the arbitral world. The arbitral world is characterised by 
numerous institutional frameworks, which are unconnected to each other. Many 
treaties or arbitration clauses allow the parties to choose between several of these 
institutional frameworks. For example, the disputing investor party in NAFT A 
arbitral proceedings may choose between the UNCITRAL Rules, the ICSID 
Rules, or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 252 This characteri tic of arbitration 
means that even if institutionalised consolidation in ICSJD were to substantially 
lessen the instance of inconsistent decisions, this may not be replicated in other 
areas. 
The draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was negotiated in 
an attempt to harmonise international investment laws and practices. 253 
egotiations for the agreement began in 1995, but were discontinued in 1998 
because of a lack of agreement.254 The draft MAI contained a provision on 
consolidation in Article D.9,255 which was a provision of significant debate for 
the negotiating group.256 
F Summa,y 
The above analysis makes it clear that the consolidation of separately 
commenced arbitral proceedings could lead to numerous procedural difficulties. 
Gaillard notes that these difficulties may be accentuated by the fact that most 
arbitration rules are designed to accommodate two-party arbitrations. 257 This, of 
course, could be remedied by an amendment to the JCSJD Arbitration Rules. It 
252 NAFT A, above n 180, article 1120. 
253 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development www.oecd.org (accessed 6 
September 2008). 
254 Ibid . 
255 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development "The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment: Draft Consolidated Text" (22 April 1998) DAFFE/MAl(98)7 REV! , art D.9. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Gaillard "The Consolidation of Arbitral Proceedings and Court Proceedings", above n 16, 37; 
Philippe Leboulanger "Multi-Contract Arbitration" ( 1996) J Int Arb 43, 43 . 
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seems that the first step in this process has been taken with the introduction of the 
amended ICSID Arbitration Rules in 2006. 258 These Rules allow for increased 
third party participation in IC SID arbitrations, most notably in the form of written 
submissions. 259 Rule 32 also allows for third parties to "attend or observe all or 
part of the hearings", subject to the parties' approval. 260 
IX HOW COULD CONSOLIDATION BE INTRODUCED IN ICSID? 
An important question remams as to how consolidation could be 
introduced into the ICSID framework. The answer to this question is important 
as it could, on its own, detennine whether consolidation is a viable option within 
ICSID. There are two ways to change the framework of ICSID. The first is to 
change the ICSID Convention itself Such an amendment is difficult to achieve, 
for it would need to be approved by all of the state parties to the Convention. 261 
At present, the ICSID Convention has 143 Contracting States.262 A testament to 
the difficulty involved in amending the ICSID Convention is that it has never 
been amended since it came into force in 1966. The second way to amend the 
ICSID framework is to amend the ICSID Arbitration Rules. This may be done 
by a two-thirds majority of the Administrative Council of ICSID. 263 It is 
therefore substantially easier to amend the Arbitration Rules than it is to amend 
the Convention itself The question, therefore, is whether the introduction of 
con olidation could be effected by an amendment to the Arbitration Rules. 
A The Administrative Council's Power to Amend 
J Article 6(J)(c) 
Article 6 outlines the powers of the Administrative Council. Among 
other thing , it gives the Administrative Council the power to, "adopt the rules of 
258 ICSID Arbitration Rules, above n 27. 
259 Ibid, r 37. 
260 Ibid, r 32. 
26 1 IC ID Convention, above n 17. art 66. 
262 JC ID website, above n 2. 
m ICSID Convention, above n 17. art 6, see Appendix Two. 
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procedure for conciliation and arbitration proceedings". 264 The current 
Arbitration Rules in this respect are the newly revised version, which came into 
effect on 10 April 2006.265 Christoph Schreuer notes that during the drafting of 
the Convention there was disagreement over whether the Arbitration Rules 
should be included in the Convention itself 266 Ultimately, the view that a degree 
of flexibility was needed to allow the Arbitration Rules to be amended, if 
necessary, convinced the drafters.267 The Arbitration Rules are designed to 
supplement the Convention, and may accordingly not be contrary to it. 268 
It could therefore be argued that the Administrative Council has the 
power to introduce consolidation into the Arbitration Rule , because such an 
amendment would simply be as to the rules of procedure for arbitration 
proceedings.269 Consolidation, with the view of achieving procedural economy, 
is a procedural matter. In this way, it is no different to the other provisions of the 
Arbitration Rules. It does not affect the substantive determination of the parties ' 
claims, merely the procedure by which those claims are determined . Moreover, 
the Administrative Council consists of one representative of each contracting 
state,270 and must adopt amendments to the Arbitration Rule by a two-third 
majority. 27 1 The adoption of a consolidation framework by the Administrative 
Council would therefore be defensible on the grounds that it reflected the will of 
the majority of the members oflCSID. 
There are, however, some limitations on this power, which may mean 
that a change in the Arbitration Rules may not be enough to implement 
consolidation in a meaningful way. Even if the Arbitration Rules could be u ed 
to introduce consolidation into the ICSID framework, they would be limited by 
264 Ibid , art 6( I )(c), see Appendix Two. 
265 ICSID Arbitration Rules, above n 27 . 
266 Schreuer, above n 28, art 6, para I 0; see also Internationa l Centre for tl1e ettlement of 
Investment Disputes " Documents Concerning tlie Origin and Formulation of the Convention" 
(Vo! 2, ICSID, Washington D.C., 1968) 79, para 17; 288; 327 ; 382; 479; 560, para 17 [ICSID 
Convention Fom1ulation Documents]. 
267 Schreuer, ibid. 
268 Ibid , art 6, para 11 and art 44, paras 30-31. 
269 JC ID Convention, above n 17, art 6(1 )(c) . 
270 Ibid , art 4( I) . 
271 Ibid, art 6( I ). 
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the ability of the parties to agree to different rule of procedure.
272 
Although the 
parties may not modify the rules that reflect "nonderogable provisions of the 
Convention",273 they may agree on virtually any other rules of procedure.
274 
For 
example, parties using the 2004 US Model BIT agree to the provision on 
consolidation contained in that treaty.
275 That provision will be enforced by 
ICSID, despite the fact that it is not part of the Arbitration Rules. As noted in the 
history of the Convention, the Arbitration Rules are "model rules which the 
parties [ are J free to adopt or not. "276 In this way, the introduction of a 
consolidation provision in the Arbitration Rules would not affect the parties' 
substantive rights, nor would it impact on the principle of party autonomy. 
However, given that at least one party will generally be in favour of 
consolidation where it is appropriate, the provision could still be effective. In 
addition, changing the Arbitration Rules to provide for consolidation within 
ICSID could act as an incentive to agree to consolidation, in that parties would 
have to actively agree to contract out of this rule.
277 
2 Article 6(3) 
Alternatively, an argument could be advanced that Article 6(3) provides 
the necessary scope for the Administrative Council to approve the introduction of 
institutional consolidation in ICSID. Art 6(3) provides that "[t]he Administrative 
Council shall also exercise such other powers and perform such other functions 
as it shall detem1ine to be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of 
this Convention."27 8 The question is whether this provision is wide enough to 
give the Administrative Council the power to unilaterally introduce mandatory 
institutional consolidation: is the introduction of consolidation "necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions" of the ICSID Convention? One could argue 
272 Ibid , art 44; see also ICSID Convention Formulation Documents, above n 266, 79, para 17; 
I 07, para 4; 110, para 15; 249; 357 ; 383: 479 : 481 : 692. 
rn Schreuer, above n 28, art 44, para 19; ee also ICSID Convention Fomrnlation Documents, 
ibid, 357. 
274 For other limits on the power of the parties to agree on different rules of procedure, see 
Schreuer, ibid, art 44, paras 19-22 and for discussion on the parties' freedom to exclude or vary 
the Rules, see art 44, paras 11-29. 
275 United States Model BIT 2004, art 33. 
276 ICSID Convention Formulation Documents, above n 266, 692 . 
277 IC ID Convention, above n 17, art 44. 
278 Ibid, art 6(3), see Appendix Two. 
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that the volume of claims submitted to ICSID that have ansen out of the 
Argentine Fiscal Crisis is testing the capacity of ICSID. 279 In order for the 
framework to respond to the increa ing number of claims submitted to it, a 
system of consolidation for claims arising out of the same event is necessary. 
However, it does not strictly follow that consolidation i "necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of [ICSID]". Consolidation may be useful or 
helpful in the implementation of ICSID, but it seems difficult to ay that it is 
necessary. 
Article 6(3) was originally drafted in wider terms in an earlier draft of the 
Convention. 280 That version would have given the Administrative Council a 
residual power to amend the Arbitration Rules "as may be necessary or useful for 
the operation of the Centre and the achievement of the purposes of the 
Convention. "281 This was rejected a being too open-ended. 
In 1978, the Administrative Council used Ar1icle 6(3) to adopt the 
Additional Facility. Some questioned the ability of the Administrative Council 
to make this decision given the scope of their powers in Article 6(3).282 As 
Schreuer notes, the adoption of the Additional Facility by the Administrative 
Council "shows that there is some flexibility without a formal amendment of the 
Convention."283 However, the adoption of the Additional Facility i different, in 
some ways, to the adoption of a consolidation framework. The Additional 
Facility affects, first and foremost, the Secretariat, as it allows non-partic to the 
ICSID Convention to use the ICSID facility, thus increasing the workload of the 
Secretariat. It does not impact upon the parties themselve , a consolidation 
would. 
279 Bishop and Luzi , above n 21 , 425. 
280 Schreuer, above n 28, art 6, para 23; lCSID onvcntion Fonnulation Documents, above n 266, 
659 . 
28 1 chreuer, ibid , art 6, para 23 ; ICSID Convention Fonnulation Documents, ibid , 659. 
282 Aron Broches "Convention on the ettlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
ationals of Other States of I 965: Explanatory ote and urvey of its Application" ( 1993) 18 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 627, 633 . 
2 
' chreuer. abo\e n 28. art 66. para 6. 
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It may therefore be concluded that the establishment of consolidation by 
the Administrative Council would be outside the sco pe of Article 6(3), even in 
light of the broad interpretation given to this Article to introduce the Additional 
Facility. This is because consolidation could not be seen as "necessary" for the 
implementation of the Convention. 
3 Summary 
It is submitted that while Article 6(3) may not provide the necessary 
cope to the Administrative Council to introduce a consolidation procedure, 
Article 6( I)( c) gives the Administrative Council the power to amend the rules 
regulating ICSID procedure. Given that consolidation is something that affects 
the procedural aspect of claims, it seems to fall within the ambit of Article 
6( I)( c). While it is possible for the parties to contract out of these Rules, there 
eems to be no barrier on the Administrative Council introducing a prirna facie 
rule of consolidation by its power in Article 6( I)( c). 
As the ICSID Secretariat already plays a role in identifying cases that are 
appropriate for consolidation, and is in the best position to survey all claims 
submitted to ICSID, it is suggested that the Secretariat be responsible for 
administering the provisio n on consolidation. Another option is the creation of a 
Consolidation Tribunal, as is the practice in NAFT A. 
B The Purpose of the Convention 
When considering changes to the ICSID system, the purpose of the 
Convention mu t be kept in mind. The purposes of the ICSID Convention are 
commented on by the Repott of the Executive Directors on the Convention.284 
One of the major purpo es of the Convention was to promote international 
investment by the promotion of "an atmosphere of mutual confidence",285 and 
28 4 
Internat ional Bank for Reconstruction and Development "The Report of the Executive 
Directors on the Convention on tJ1e ett lement of In vestment Disputes Between tales and 
ationa ls of Other States" ( 18 Ma rch 1965). 
285 Ibid , para 9 . 
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"stimulate a larger flow of private international investment".286 This was sought 
to be achieved by the establishment of the Centre to provide arbitration and 
conciliation facilities. 28 7 In an indirect way, these purposes could be achieved by 
consolidation, as ICSID will not be able to function as a promoter of 
international investment if it is not able to deal with its caseload in a timely 
manner; states and investors will, in this ea e, look elsewhere for remedies. 
X OTHER OPTIONS 
While consolidation is considered to be the most effective way of 
ensuring like claims are not determined in an unlike manner, other options do 
exist. In the domestic realm, for example, there are several option other than 
consolidation. A domestic court can order simultaneous trials, immediately 
successive trials, or order the stay of all but one of the proceedings pending the 
determination of one of them. 288 
This part will canvas some of the other options open to the ICSID system 
that may achieve similar results to consolidation. It will principally consider: the 
possibility of appointing the same tribunal to hear similar decisions; the 
establishment of a system of precedent in the ICSID system; the introduction of 
an appellate review body in ICSID; and the use of incentives to encourage parties 
to consolidate. 
A Appointment of the Same Tribunal 
One option is that like claims may be cheduled for hearing in front of the 
same tribunal. 289 Under this option, the claims can be heard either together or 
286 Ibid , para 12. 
287 l SID Convention, above n 17, art 1(2) . 
288 High Court Rules ( Z), r 382. 
289 Mclachlan, hore and Weiniger, above n 9, para 4.145. Examples of such cases include 
Sa/ini Construttori SpA and ltalstrade SpA ,, Kingdom <lMorocco (Jurisdiction) 6 ICSID Rep 
398 (ICSID, 200 l, Briner P, Cremades & Fadlallah) and Consortium RFCC ,, Kingdom of 
Morocco (Award) 20 IC ID Rev-FILJ 391 (IC ID, 2003, Briner P, remades & Fadlallah); 
Sempra Energy, above n 72 and Camu::.::.i international SA ,. A1gentine Republic (Jurisdiction) 
IC ID Case o ARB 03 2 (IC ID. 2005, Orrego Vicui"'ia P. Lalonde & Rico); Electricidad 
A,gentina SA and EDF International SA ,. A1ge111ine Republic IC ID Case o ARB/03 /22 
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seriatim. 290 An example of this in practice can be seen in two cases brought 
against Argentina in the aftermath of the Argentine fiscal crisis: Sempra Energy 
!nternationa/291 and Camuzzi International SA. 29
2 Both cases were decided by a 
tribunal consi ting of Francisco Orrego Vicuna as President, Marc Lalonde and 
Sandra Morelli Rico. This option involves agreement and coordination between 
the investor partie , as generally they will jointly appoint one arbitrator.
293 
The ICSID Secretariat's role in this practice can be seen in the cases of 
Sahni v Kingdom of Morocco2'J.1 and Consortium RFCC v Kingdom of 
Morocco. 295 The ICSID Secretariat has assumed the role of trying to encourage 
the parties to consolidate proceedings as much as possible.
296 When the Sahni 
case was submitted to ICSID, the Secretariat recognised that it was similar in 
many aspects to the Consortium R.F. C. C case. The Secretariat therefore 
recommended to the parties that they appoint the same arbitrators for both 
cases. 297 The parties followed this recommendation. The cases were heard 
separately, however the fact that the composition of the tribunal was identical 
meant that the danger of inconsistent decisions was avoided. This option allows 
the parties, and especially the investor party, the freedom to conduct their 
proceedings without the burden of consolidation, but at the same time, 
substantially reducing the risk of inconsistent decisions. lt is suggested that 
parties to a dispute be given the ability to request that the Secretariat review a 
group of submissions to arbitration with the view to recommending that the 
parties appoint the same arbitrators in each of the related disputes. 
(ICSID. Park P. Kaufinann-Kohler & de Trazegnies Granda) and EDF International SA, SAUR 
International SA & Leon Participations Argentinas SA v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No 
ARB/03 '23 (ICSID. Park P. Kaufi11ann-Kohier & de Trazegnies Granda); Suez and InterAguas 
Sen·icios, above n 22 and Aguas Cordobesas, SA, Sue::, and Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona SA ,·Argentine Republic IC ID Case o ARB/03/18 (ICSID, Saiacuse P. Kaufi11ann-
Kohler & Nikken) and Sue::, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal 
SA ,, Argentine Republic ICSID Case o ARB 03/19 (ICISD, Salacuse P. Kaufi11ann-Kohler & 
Nikken). 
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292 Camu::::i International. above n 289. 
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ICSJD could therefore develop a rule whereby cases presenting common 
issues of law or fact are submitted to the same tribunal. This would help to avoid 
conflicting decisions, while allowing investors to keep their claim separate from 
others. Potential drawbacks of this idea could be that this would deprive the 
parties of the ability to choose their own arbitrators. Jt could also result in longer 
delays in having a case decided, as one tribunal would only be able to deal with 
so many cases at the one time. Therefore, while it may decrease the risk of 
inconsistent decisions, it would not achieve greater procedural economy within 
the system. 
B A System of Precedent 
The problem of inconsistent decisions in ICSID arises, and is able to exist 
without undermining the whole system, because there is no principle of stare 
decisis in international investment law. This position is reflected in NAFTA 
where it is expressly stated that "[a]n award made by a Tribunal shall have no 
binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular 
case."298 Christoph Schreuer also argues that Article 53 of the ICSID Convention 
reflects this principle. Article 53 provides that "[t]he award shall be binding on 
the parties" and Schreuer notes that the interpretation of thi statement to be that 
the award shall "only be binding on the parties" is supported by the absence of 
any suggestion that a principle of stare decisis exists in the sy tern in the travaux 
, . f h C . 299 preparatoires o t e onvent1on. 
Regardless of the lack of any principle of stare decisis, "contradicting 
awards nevertheless create insecurity about the proper state of the law and put the 
legitimacy of the system of investment arbitration into question."300 One option, 
therefore, is to establish a system of precedent in ICSID.30 ' The idea that arbitral 
298 NAFTA, above n 180, art 1136(1). 
299 Schreuer, above n 28, art 53, para 15 . ee also Mclachlan, hore and Weiniger. above n 9, 
paras 3.83-3.103. 
100 Schill, above n 38, 278. See also Susan D Franck "ll1e Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty rbitration : Privatizing Public lnternational Law Through lnconsistent Decisions" (2005) 
73 Fordham Law Review 1521 . 
101 For a discussion on the value of precedent in investment treaty arbitration see Tai-lleng Cheng 
" Precedent and Control in Lnvestment Treaty Arbitration" (2007) 30 Fordham Lnternational Law 
Journal 1014. 
61 
decisions should ca1Ty so me sort of precedential value has been advanced by 
some academics in the past .302 However, establishing a system of precedent in 
investment treaty arbitration as a whole would present several apparently 
insurmountable difficulties, the most important of which being the confidential 
nature of some proceedings and decisions. The fragmented nature of the 
investment treaty arbitration landscape would also contribute to this difficulty. 
It has been noted, however, that previous decisions on common points in 
the ICSID system are often highly persuasive in subsequent tribunals. 303 Some 
have even argued that "an informal, but powerful" system of precedent does in 
fact exist in inve tment treaty arbitration. 304 However, the reality is that without 
a formal system of precedent, there is no need for tribunals to consider or follow 
previous decisions if they do not want to . This can be evidenced by the LG&E 
Tribunal's treatment of the CMS decision. 305 
Another problem with establishing a system of precedent in ICSID is that 
this would necessarily also involve establishing an appellate review body, as 
without a mechanism for higher review, bad decisions would become the law, and 
the law would be unable to develop past these decisions. 
C Appellate Review 
The dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in investment treaty 
arbitration can be seen in the calls for reform of the system from both academics 
and practitioners, the noisiest of which have been those arguing for an appellate 
review system in ICSID. 306 The ICSID Discussion Paper, released in 2004, 
concerning the revisio ns of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, noted that efficiency, 
'
02 Franck "Do Ln vestment Trea ti es Have a Bright Future", above n 3, 56. 
'°' Franck, ibid, 57; David A Gantz "ll1e Evolution of FT A Ln vestment Provisions: From 
AFTA to the United- tales-Chile Free Trade Agreement" (2004) 19 Am U lnt ' l L Rev 679, 
689. 
·
104 ee for example, Cheng, above n 30 I, I O 16. ee also Gabrielle Kaufiiiann-Kohler "Arbitra l 
Precedent: Dream, ecessity or Excuse?: The 2006 Fresh fields Lecture" (2007) 23 Arb lnt 357. 
105 See Part III A 3 The Ramifi ca ti ons of these Decisions. 
'°6 See for example David A Gantz "An Appell ate Mechanism fo r Review of Arbitra l Decisions 
in Investor-Sta te Disputes: Prospects and hallenges" (2006) 39 Vand J Transna t ' I L 39; Walsh, 
above n 4: Barton Legum "Opti ons to Establi sh an Appe ll ate Mechanism for IJ1vestment 
Disputes" in Sauvant. above n 10. 231. 
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economy, coherence and consistency in ICSID case law would be best erved by 
an appeal mechanism within [CSID. 307 This recommendation was not 
implemented; it was concluded in 2005 that the establishment of any ICSID 
appellate mechani m was "premature".308 Intere tingl y, however, some recent 
BITs and FT As include the pos ibility of e tablishing an appellate mechanism. 309 
It seems that if consolidation were introduced to remedy inconsistent 
decisions, an appellate system would be necessary. Ifthere is no appellate review 
system then consolidation could lead to bad decisions. If these bad decisions are 
followed, these repeat precedents could "gain perhaps undue weight and authority 
within the system."310 It is perhap necessary therefore that con olidation and 
appellate review are either introduced hand-in-hand, or remain ab ent hand-in-
hand. On the other hand, consolidation based on the desire for procedural 
economy would not present such a fundamental challenge to the system, as the 
aim is not to develop a body of consistent jurisprudence, but to establish a system 
that operates more efficiently. 
D The Use of Incentives to Encourage Voluntary Consolidation 
The instances of voluntary consolidation in ICSID demonstrate that 
consolidation can be in an investo r 's best interests. 311 The challenge for ICSID 
therefore is to tip the balance of interests in favour of consolidation in case 
where similar issues arise, or where severa l cases ar ise from the ame event. 
ICSID could encourage partie to enter into BITs and FT As that provide for 
consolidation. The 2004 US Model BIT now has such a provis ion. 3 12 FT A such 
as NAFTA and CAFTA provide example of consolidation in the FTA realm. 
The recently concluded FTA between New Zealand and China also contains a 
307 IC ID Discussion Paper, above n 4, 15-16. 
308 ICS ID Working Paper, above n 26, 4 . For a brief discussion on t11e advantages and 
disadvantages ofan appellate review system, see Katia Yannaca- mall " Improvi ng tlle ystem of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The OECD Governments ' Perspective" in Sauvant, above n 
I 0, 223 ; OECD international ln l'estment Perspectil ·e.1, above n 142, 19 1- 195. 
109 See for example DR-CA FT A, abo\'e n 187, art I 0.20(9)(b) and Annex I 0-F: United tates 
Model BIT 2004, art 28(9)(b) and Annex D. 
"
0 Burke-White, above n 53, 24. 
111 ee Part lI C The IC ID ystem at Present, discussing the Sue::. case. 
112 United tales Model BIT 2004, art 33 . 
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consolidation provision. 313 However, this provision still requires the con ent of 
all disputing parties before multiple claims are consolidated.
314 In light of 
previous influential FTAs, such as NAFTA, which contain mandatory 
consolidation provisions, it seems unlikely that a consolidation provision 
requiring consent, like the one in the ew Zealand - China FT A, will be effective. 
Additionally, ICSID could provide other incentives, such as monetary benefits to 
the parties to encourage con olidation. 
XI CONCLUSION: STRIKING THE BALANCE 
The issue of consolidation in ICSID is effectively a question of striking 
the correct balance between protecting the traditional benefits of arbitration, and 
promoting consistency, predictability and procedural economy within the system. 
While it may be true that "some degree of dysfunctionality is inherent in 
every system of adjudication", 315 fundamental flaws in the ICSID system should 
not be able to be explained simply by citing party autonomy. While party 
autonomy will, and should, remain the cornerstone of investment treaty 
arbitration, the system must be able to respond and develop to challenges that are 
presented. [n this way, ICSID must not simply ignore the instances of 
inconsistent decision and procedural inefficiencies, and the resulting cries that 
the system is being brought into disrepute. 
In response to the thesis of this paper: whether IC SID should establish an 
institutional framework for consolidation, the following points may be made by 
way of conclusion. 
A The Basis upon which Claims may be Consolidated 
As noted in this paper, claims may be consolidated with the underlying 
rationale of promoting consistent decision-making, or of promoting procedural 
111 ew Zealand - China Free Trade Agreement (7 April 2008) www.chinafta.govt.nz (accessed 
26 eptember 2008). art 156. 
114 Ibid . 
115 Brov.:er, Brower and harpe. abo,e n 13 . 440. 
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economy. It is often asserted that the need for consolidation arises where there is 
an issue of law or fact in common that gives rise to the possibility of inconsistent 
awards. 316 This paper has argued that this second requirement need not 
necessarily be part of the rationale for consolidation in ICSID. In fact , the paper 
recommends that consolidating claims on the ba is of achieving greater 
procedural economy is the category that ICS1D should focus on in developing a 
mechanism for consolidation. Consolidation would therefore be appropriate in 
circumstances where several claims arise out of the same event, or equence of 
events. A prime example of such a situation is the claims arising out of the 
Argentine Fiscal Crisis. 
Consolidating claims on the basis of procedural economy is to be 
preferred over consolidating to achieve consistency in decision-making, as this 
presents less of a challenge to the framework in which arbitration operates. 
Procedural economy may be seen as an inherent value of arbitration, wherea 
consistency of decision-making conflicts with the principle of finality. Su an 
Franck notes that "[u]ltimately, because legal error cannot be corrected in 
ICSID awards, the possibility of inconsistent awards is an accepted reality at 
ICSID, and the correctness of decisions has been sacrificed for the sake of 
finality."317 For better or for worse, this may be an element of the investment 
treaty arbitration system that is not amenable to change. Promoting consistency 
of arbitral decisions thus presents a fundamental challenge to the underlying 
balance struck in arbitration. 
B Introducing Consolidation into the ICSJD Framework 
This paper recommends that a consolidation provi ion be introduced into 
the ICSID Arbitration Rule by the Admini trative Council under Article 6(1)(c) . 
Use of this provision of the Convention to introduce consolidation into ICSJD has 
two important aspects. Fir tly, it mean that the amendment need not be 
approved by all parties to the Convention. Secondly, it is important to note that 
316 ee for example OECD International Im ·estment Perspectil ·es, above n 142. 230 and 23 8. 
317 Franck "The Legitimacy Cri sis in In vestment Treaty Arbitration", abO\ e n 300. 1548. ll1i s is 
a lso noted by chreuer. above n 28. art 52. para 14. 
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the introduction of a consolidation prov1s1on into the Arbitration Rules would 
effectively amount to a presumption in favour of consolidation, for the parties 
would be subject to the consolidation provisions in the ICSID Rules unless they 
agreed otherwise. 318 
It is submitted that the time is ripe for the consideration of a consolidation 
provision in ICSID. The Argentine cases provide the impetus to do something to 
improve the procedural inefficiencies of ICSID. Moreover, consolidation 
provisions continue to appear in an increasing number of Model BITs and FT As. 
The recent revision of the ICSID Regulations and Rules to provide, amongst 
other things, for the involvement of third parties in arbitrations, signifies a 
willingness to change the ICSID framework to respond to emerging challenges. 
Consolidation is but another procedural mechanism designed to improve the 
traditional benefits of arbitration in the form of greater procedural economy. The 
introduction of consolidation could therefore help improve the delivery of justice 
in ICSID, resulting in benefits for all involved. 
" TI1e parties already have the power lo agree to di fTerent rules of procedure: IC ID 
Convention. above n 17. art 44. 
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APPENDIX ONE: NAFTA, ARTICLE 1126 
Article 1126: Consolidation 
1. A Tribunal established under this Article shall be established under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and shall conduct its proceedings in accordance 
with those Rules, except as modified by this Section. 
2. Where a Tribunal established under this Article i satisfied that claims have 
been submitted to arbitration under Article 1120 that have a question of law or 
fact in common, the Tribunal may, in the interests of fair and efficient resolution 
of the claim , and after hearing the disputing parties, by order: 
(a) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the 
claims; or (b) assume jurisdiction over, and hear and detem1ine one or more of 
the claims, the detennination of which it believes would assist in the resolution 
of the others. 
3. A disputing party that seeks an order under paragraph 2 shall request the 
Secretary-General to establish a Tribunal and shall specify in the request: 
(a) the name of the disputing Party or disputing investors against which the order 
is sought; (b) the nature of the order sought; and (c) the grounds on which the 
order is sought. 
4. The disputing party shall deliver to the di puting Party or di puting investors 
against which the order is sought a copy of the request. 
5. Within 60 days of receipt of the request, the Secretary-General shall establish 
a Tribunal comprising three arbitrators. The Secretary-General shall appoint the 
presiding arbitrator from the roster referred to in Article 1124(4). In the event 
that no such presiding arbitrator is available to serve, the Secretary-General shal I 
appoint, from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, a presiding arbitrator who is not a 
national of any of the Parties. The Secretary-General hall appoint the two other 
members from the roster referred to in Article 1124( 4), and to the extent not 
available from that roster, from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrator , and to the extent 
not available from that Panel, in the discretion of the Secretary-General. One 
member shall be a national of the disputing Party and one member shall be a 
national of a Party of the disputing investors. 
6. Where a Tribunal has been establi hed under thi Article, a disputing inve tor 
that has submitted a claim to arbitration under Article I 116 or I I 17 and that ha 
not been named in a request made under paragraph 3 may make a written request 
to the Tribunal that it be included in an order made under paragraph 2, and shall 
specify in the request: 
(a) the name and address of the disputing investor; (b) the nature of the order 
sought; and (c) the grounds on which the order is ought. 
7. A disputing inve tor referred to in paragraph 6 hall deliver a copy of its 
request to the di puting parties named in a request made under paragraph 3 . 
8. A Tribunal establi hed under Article 11 20 hall not have juri diction to decide 
a claim, or a part of a claim, over which a Tribunal e tab Ii hed under thi Article 
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has assumed jurisdiction. 
9. On application of a disputing party, a Tribunal established under this Article, 
pending its decision under paragraph 2, may order that the proceedings of a 
Tribunal established under Article 1120 be stayed , unless the latter Tribunal has 
already adjourned its proceedings. 
10. A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat, within 15 days of receipt by 
the disputing Party, a copy of: 
(a) a request for arbitration made under paragraph (I) of Aiiicle 36 of the ICSID 
Convention; (b) a notice of arbitration made under Article 2 of Schedule C of the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or (c) a notice of arbitration given under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
11 . A disputing Party shall deliver to the Secretariat a copy of a request made 
under paragraph 3: 
(a) within 15 days of receipt of the request , in the case of a request made by a 
disputing investor; (b) within 15 days of making the request , in the case of a 
request made by the disputing Party. 
12. A disputing Party hall deliver to the Secretariat a copy of a request made 
under paragraph 6 within 15 days of receipt of the request. 
13 . The Secretariat shall maintain a public register of the documents referred to 
in paragraphs I 0, I 1 and 12. 
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APPENDIX TWO: ICSID CONVENTION, ARTICLE 6 
Article 6: 
(1) Without prejudice to the power and functions vested in it by other provisions 
of this Convention, the Administrative Council shall: 
(a) adopt the administrative and financial regulations of the Centre; 
(b) adopt the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings; 
(c) adopt the rules of procedure for conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings (hereinafter called the Conciliation Rule and the Arbitration 
Rules) ; 
(d) approve arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's 
administrative facilities and services; 
(e) determine the conditions of service of the Secretary-General and of 
any Deputy Secretary-General; 
(f) adopt the annual budget ofrevenues and expenditure of the Centre; 
(g) approve the annual report on the operation of the Centre. 
The deci ions referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (f) above shall be 
adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Administrative 
Council. 
(2) The Administrative Council may appoint such committees as it considers 
necessary. 
(3) The Administrative Council shall also exercise uch other powers and 
perform such other functions as it hall determine to be necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention. 
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